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I. BACKGROUND
A. Introduction
On January 1, 1991, the Louisiana State Law Institute revision of the law of
separation and divorce took effect. The revision was the culmination of a seven-
year project undertaken by the Persons Committee of the Law Institute' as part of
its charge to revise Book I of the Louisiana Civil Code, "Of Persons."2 The
elimination of separation from bed and board and the creation of a ground for
divorce dependent upon the spouses' living separate and apart after the petition for
divorce is filed constituted the most significant changes wrought by the 1991
legislation.
This article will recount the deliberations of the committee and the various
alternative reforms of divorce law that were considered, rejected, and passed.
Understanding the revision project's history, albeit abbreviated for this article, is
important to understanding the project's ultimate results. Thereafter, the authors
add commentary to each article of the new divorce law to assist members of the
legal profession in understanding the intent of each provision. What may be
particularly helpful is the legislative history of a specific provision, including
decisions made by the Council of the Law Institute before submission of the
revision project to the legislature and amendments by the legislature to the Law
Institute bill as introduced.
1. The Persons Committee of the Louisiana State Law Institute is composed of the following
academicians, judges, and attorneys: Professor Katherine Spaht, Reporter; Mr. Kenneth Rigby;
Professor Cynthia Samuel; Professor Kathryn Lorio; Professor Christopher Blakesley; Professor
Jeanne Carriere, Mr. Phillip Riegel; and Judge Don Moseley. The committee is ably assisted in its
research and drafting by Mr. Leonard Martin, staff attorney for the Louisiana State Law Institute.
Hereafter, the Persons Committee will be referred to as the committee.
Credit for passage of the divorce law revision belongs to Mr. Allen Bradley, who in 1990 was a
member of the House of Representatives from DeRidder, Louisiana.
2. The objectives of the Louisiana Law Institute are "[tlo examine and study the civil law of
Louisiana and the Louisiana jurisprudence and statutes of the state with a view of discovering defects
and inequities and of recommending needed reforms," La. R.S. 24:204(2) (1989), and "to bring the
law of the state, both civil and criminal, into harmony with modern conditions," La. R.S. 24:204(5)
(1989).
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B. Goals for Divorce Revision
The divorce law revision had two primary goals: first, to make divorce, to the
extent legally possible, a less traumatic experience both emotionally and economi-
cally by devising a system that would reduce the emotional investment and
litigation costs; and second, to assure the reduction of the adverse after-effects of
divorce, particularly for the innocent parties-the children and to a lesser degree
the spouse whose economic well-being is significantly impaired.3 The committee
benefited by the experience of other jurisdictions with no-fault divorce systems,4
principally, of course, California. Interestingly, the goals of California's reformers
in the late 1960s appeared identical to those of the committee:
3. One of the current criticisms of the initial no-fault reforms is that the reformers failed to
carefully consider possible adverse consequences of no-fault divorce based on a partnership model
of marriage. This dilemma has been described elsewhere as "the dilemma of private choices that
cause public consequences." Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum. 1991
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 79, 119 (1991). In fact, current feminist writing focuses on alimony and the need
for its continuation. See, e.g., Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution (1985) [hereinafter
Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution]; Economic Consequences of Divorce: The International
Perspective (Lenore J. Weitzman & Mavis Maclean eds., 1992); Martha A. Fineman, The Illusion
of Equality: The Rhetoric and Reality of Divorce Reform (1991).
See, for example, Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the
Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in Divorce Reform at the Crossroads 191 (Stephen
D. Sugarman & Herma H. Kay eds., 1990), where the authors describe the failure as follows: "The
leading proponents of initial no-fault reform were lawyers, judges, and law professors. Their primary
focus was on the legal grounds for divorce; their primary purposes were to reduce expense, acrimony,
and fraud in resolving matters envisioned as essentially private concerns. What is, perhaps, most
revealing about these original efforts are the issues that were not on the agenda." Id. at 195. The
authors continue: "The early reform agenda did not specify clear public norms concerning financial
and child-care responsibilities to guide parties' decision making or judicial review." Id. at 196.
4. If Glick's prediction is correct, we are presently in a better position than we have
been in for many years to take stock of our situation and to try to determine what kinds
of legal measures will be appropriate for the current needs and desires of American
families. It follows, too, that states like Louisiana that did not jump hastily on the family
law reform bandwagon now have the opportunity to attack the most pressing problems in
the area in a more calm and rational way than some of their sister states.
Mary A. Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980's, 44 La. L. Rev. 1553, 1554 (1984).
The Law Institute Persons Committee was not guilty of overlooking the consequences of
divorce. Fortunately, the committee had the benefit of other states' experience and empirical research
and scholars' writings on the subject. Therefore, the committee carefully considered the adverse
impact of divorce on children (e.g., a proposal for divorce of spouses with minor children, proposals
on child custody and most importantly, child support) and the economically disadvantaged spouse
(e.g., proposals on spousal support replacing fault of the claimant as an absolute bar with comparative
fault as a mere factor and establishing the support at a level consistent with the standard of living of
the couple during marriage, emphasizing the duration of the marriage).
See also Wardle, supra note 3; Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and
Moral Discourse, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 197 (1991); Ira M. Ellman, Should The Theory of Alimony
Include Nonfinancial Losses and Motivations?, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 259 (1991).
1993]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The motivations of those who participated in the California divorce reform
effort were far from uniform, but most of them shared the view that
divorce based on fault no longer served the public interest. They
undertook to design and implement a divorce law that would take account
of the realities of married life, the economic needs of divorced dependent
spouses, and the best interests of children.
5
The latter two goals have been only recently recognized and widely accepted
as laudable and necessary by other American scholars.6 Recognition of the
importance of the goals of providing for the economic needs of divorced spouses
and children ordinarily came in the scholars' assessment of the alleged failure of
California's reformers to accomplish their goals.
At one of the first meetings of the Persons Committee called to consider
divorce law reform, the committee established six more specific objectives for
accomplishing the articulated goals of divorce law reform:
(1) The law should recognize that, because marriage is a personal
relationship entered into for complex personal and social reasons, the
parties to a marriage are in the best position to know when it has ceased
to serve its intended purposes. (2) Dissolution of marriage should be as
amicable as possible, and the law should encourage civility in dissolution
actions by making them non-adversarial in nature. (3) The law should
promote reconciliation between spouses by imposing a reasonable waiting
period in all divorce actions. (4) The law should seek to avoid the
adverse effects on the judicial system occasioned by fault-based and
complex no-fault schemes. (5) The law should encourage spouses to
resolve the incidents of dissolution of marriage between themselves
whenever possible. (6) Simple divorce procedures should be available in
simple cases in order to insure that everyone has access to the courts in
this area.7
During subsequent discussions about divorce law reform, the committee evaluated
each proposed alternative in light of the two fundamental goals and six specific
objectives. For example, the committee concluded that fault grounds for divorce
should be abandoned. The committee felt that such grounds fail to reflect the fact
that marriage breakdown is usually an incremental process rather than a catastroph-
ic one traceable to specific acts' and that such grounds adversely affect the judicial
5. Henina H. Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 291,
299 (1987).
6. See authorities cited in supra note 3.
7. Louisiana State Law Institute [hereinafter LSLI] materials prepared for Persons Committee
meeting on May 4, 1984, at 9.
8. Id. at 7, 8.
The history of divorce law reform in the United States over the past twenty years reveals
a continual increase in realism on the part of lawmakers and judges. At the beginning of
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system by increasing the caseload and encouraging perjury.9  Likewise, the
that period the majority of states still permitted divorce only on traditional fault grounds.
(A substantial minority, Louisiana among them, would grant a divorce after some period
of living separate and apart.) That (fault) approach had had its origin in ecclesiastical law,
both in Louisiana and in her sister states, and was apparently ultimately grounded in the
notion that, because ecclesiastical doctrine gave marriage a religious dimension, marriage
should only be dissolved for a religiously significant reason-i.e., a sin of one party
against the other.
During the 1970's state legislatures apparently came to accept the assertions of legal
scholars that the fault approach did not accurately reflect what occurred in most marriage
breakdowns, and that it deterred reconciliation by forcing spouses to adopt adversary
attitudes toward each other. Beginning with California in 1970, an increasing number of
states enacted new, no-fault divorce laws that made dissolution of marriage available on
such easily proven grounds as "irreconcilable differences," "incompatibility." Today (in
1984) thirty-nine of the fifty states have such laws (usually alongside statutes embodying
the more traditional fault grounds). Only one state, South Dakota, still permits divorce
exclusively on fault grounds.
Id. (citations omitted).
9. Katherine S. Spaht, Persons, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973
Term, 34 La. L. Rev. 201, 203-04 (1974); Broussard v. Broussard, 275 So. 2d 410, 413 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1973) (Miller, J., dissenting). See also Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution, supra note 3, at
20; Walter Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 Va. L. Rev. 32 (1966); and
Timothy B. Walker, Beyond Fault: An Examination of Patterns of Behavior in Response to Present
Divorce Laws, 10 J. Fam. L. 267 (1971). For a recent historical treatment of the development of
American divorce law, see Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce,
76 Va. L. Rev. 9 (1990) and Glenda Riley, Divorce: An American Tradition (1991).
In Thomas B. Marvell, Divorce Rates and the Fault Requirement, 23 Law & Soc'y Rev. 543, 565
(1989) (citation omitted), the author opines:
In all, the findings thus support the proposition that prevailing customs and peoples'
immediate wants can totally thwart and not just partly circumvent laws enacting morality.
Moreover, the legal system itself apparently subverted the laws; by all accounts, the
lawyers actively participated in circumventing the fault requirements, and judges
knowingly presided over sham proceedings. As one lawyer noted, the fault provisions
meant that "the courts must often sanction clear violations of the law upon the thinnest
of pretexts in order to avert the ruin of many lives." If this can happen in the legal
system, the implication is that the complete nullification of laws legislating morals is
likely elsewhere, but the difficulty of obtaining evidence may prevent any test of this
hypothesis.
See also Herbert Jacob, Silent Revolution: The Transformation of Divorce Law in the United
States 7 (1988); June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology.
Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 953 (1991).
In Kay, supra note 5, at 292, the author observes: "That impasse was characterized by an uneasy
and largely unspoken compromise between legal theory, which preserved the ideal of marriage as
indissoluble except for specific acts of marital misconduct, and courtroom practice, which granted
divorces based simply on an agreement between the spouses."
In fact, at least one author proposes a return to divorce only with mutual consent but not the
"hypocritical grounds" that existed under fault systems. The author proposes mutual consent divorce
because of "[t]he incapacity of no-fault divorce to force the divorcing spouse to recognize all the
costs of divorce .... " Allen M. Parkman, No-Fault Divorce: What Went Wrong? at xiii (1992).
See also Wardle, supra note 3, at 112, in which the author suggests that no-fault divorce reform
merely shifted the point in the proceedings at which perjury occurs.
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committee concluded that the predicate of living separate and apart as a ground for
divorce should be abandoned because such a prerequisite simply imposed an
unnecessary requirement on spouses who wished to dissolve their marriage, one not
thought essential in most other states.' Furthermore, the requirement of living
separate and apart, in many cases, defeated the main purpose of such statutory
waiting periods-to promote reconciliation." Spouses would not risk attempts
at reconciliation if it had the effect of extinguishing a cause of action. The original
product of the Persons Committee and the Council of the Louisiana State Law
Institute was a pure no-fault divorce law. Unlike its counterparts in other
jurisdictions, however, the Louisiana no-fault proposal did not require the
functionally fictional proof that the marriage had broken down irretrievably or that
there were irreconcilable differences between the spouses.
The original proposal of the Law Institute reflected the modern view of
marriage as a voluntary association akin to partnership, at least as regards the
termination of the relationship. 2 Under Louisiana Civil Code articles 2822 and
10. Timothy B. Walker & Linda D. Elrod, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 26
Fain. L.Q. 319, 338-39 (1993). Another simple and easy resource is the summary of every state's
divorce law (grounds for divorce, alimony, child custody, child support, and property distribution)
in Faro. L. Rep. (BNA).
LSLI, materials prepared for Persons Committee meeting on May 4, 1984, at 8:
Louisiana has experienced its own version of this near-universal liberalizing trend. This
state has not, however, kept pace with the national trend toward making divorce available
without a period of separation. Since 1970, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act has
provided for divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown after a 90-day waiting
period without separation. UMDA §§ 302, 303, 305. Among the forty-nine of the sister
states that permit divorce on other than fault grounds, only ten (including Louisiana)
presently require spouses to live apart for a period of time in order to secure a divorce.
The remaining thirty-nine all offer no-fault divorce without separation in some form.
Id. (citations omitted).
11. The committee found this potentially controversial change in the law [that spouses
could freely associate with each other or even live together after filing for divorce]
justifiable on the following grounds: (I) it would permit spouses to adjust to the financial
impact of divorce by removing the necessity of their establishing two homes during the
waiting period; (2) it would promote reconciliation; and (3) in practice, few spouses would
actually choose to cohabit after filing.
LSLI, minutes of Persons Committee meeting on October 28. 1983 (dated November 14. 1983). at
6.
12. See, for example, John Eekelaar, Regulating Divorce (1991), where the author describes
different ideologies of marriage:
Honore observed that the way in which the law apportions responsibilities after divorce
reflects a view about marriage itself. He distinguished three "views" of marriage. One
was of a partnership for life which, even after divorce, creates an obligation on each
partner to allow the other to share in the available resources in the same way as would
have occurred had the marriage continued .... A variant of it sees marriage as a
partnership only until dissolution, at which point acquests must be divided equally. A
second perception (which I will call the "individualistic" model) sees marriage as an
arrangement which two persons enter for mutual benefits, but which may result in gains
to one at the expense of the other. As a consequence, the goals on breakdown are to
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2826, a partnership between two persons may be terminated virtually at will, the
only prerequisite being that the withdrawing partner give reasonable notice "in
good faith at a time that is not unfavorable to the partnership."' 3 In an important
partnership case, the Louisiana Supreme Court expressed the essence of a
partnership as "founded on mutual trust and confidence and terminable when such
cease. .. ."" That consideration seemed doubly applicable in the context of
marriage and divorce, where, because of the much greater intimacy of the
relationship, the discomfort occasioned by a forced continuation of it against the
will of one spouse was less likely to be outweighed by some countervailing
benefit. 5
provide compensation for loss of expected advantages and restitution of investments put
into the marriage, together with their increments in value in so far as these are attributable
to the claimant. A third perception sees marriage as an undertaking by one spouse to
secure the needs of the other spouse and any children which may survive the divorce. In
this model, the spouses are mutual insurers against adversity. This will be called the
"insurance" model.
Id. at 57-58 (citation omitted).
For a contrary view, see Bea A. Smith, The Partnership Theorv of Marriage: A Borrowed
Solution Fails, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 689 (1990). The author's criticism of the partnership model for
marriage is directed to the economic consequences of divorce. However, in the article she contrasts
an earlier notion of marriage described by Karl N. Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce, 32 Colum.
L. Rev. 1281 (1932). to today's notion of marriage:
All these functions existed only because marriage was seen as a permanent relation-
ship-terminable only with considerable difficulty. In contrast, today spouses are fired
when they lose their charm, children have no guarantee of care, and spouses often refuse
to continue supporting their families.
Smith, supra at 694-95. See also Mary A. Glendon, The New Family and The New Property 66
(1981); Jane Rutheford, Duty in Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 Fordham L. Rev.
539 (1990); Carbone & Brinig, supra note 9.
13. La. Civ. Code art. 2822: "if a partnership has been constituted without a term, a partner
may withdraw from the partnership without the consent of his partners at any time, provided he gives
reasonable notice in good faith at a time that is not unfavorable to the partnership."
La. Civ. Code art. 2826: "Unless continued as provided by law, a partnership is terminated by:
the unanimous consent of its partners ... or the attainment of, or the impossibility of attainment of
the object of the partnership ...."
14. Stone v. Stone, 292 So. 2d 686, 691 (La. 1974), quoting Breaux v. LeBlanc, 50 La. Ann.
228, 236, 23 So. 281, 284 (1898).
15. The permissible restraints that might be imposed upon the litigants are a mandatory
period of reflection and the duty of the court to remind them that their actions will have
a considerable impact upon their future lives. Realistically, and in terms of the legitimate
exercise of its regulatory authority, the State should do no more than this. It cannot select
a spouse for one of its citizens nor should it try to coerce him or her to remain with a
person with whom satisfactory personal communication no longer is possible. If the State
occupies any role in this process, it should be to assist the spouses to resolve their
infelicitous union through an amicable settlement rather than to vent their frustrations
through the legal process.
Thomas E. Carbonneau, Analytical and Comparative Variations on Selected Provisions of Book One
of the Louisiana Civil Code with Special Consideration of the Role of Fault in the Deternination of
Marital Disputes, 27 Loy. L. Rev. 999, 1036 (1981).
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When the issues concerned the consequences of termination of the relationship,
however, the committee and council proposed that the spouses not be treated as
ordinary partners. Ultimately, the partnership model proved desirable for
termination of the marriage but not for the other incidents of the end of the
relationship. Therefore, no consistent ideology of marriage and divorce was
incorporated in the series of bills revising divorce law.
Initially, the committee and the Council of the Law Institute were concerned
that a no-fault system of divorce would encourage an increase in the overall rate of
divorce. However, empirical evidence existed that suggested no-fault divorce laws
do not promote divorce, 6 although such laws may contribute to other inequi-
ties.17 Even those who now argue that no-fault divorce contributes to other
For a more recent discussion of the partnership model of marriage, see Rutheford, supra note
12.
16. Herma H. Kay, Beyond No-Fault: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in Divorce Reform
at the Crossroads 6 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Henna H. Kay eds., 1990); Eekelaar, supra note 12;
Harvey J. Sepler, Measuring the Effects of No-Fault Divorce Laws Across the Fifty States:
Quantifying a Zeitgeist, 15 Fain. L.Q. 65, 88-89 (1981) (no-fault laws were ineffective in altering
divorce rates in 87% of 32 states studied); Robert E. McGraw et al., A Case Study in Divorce Law
Reform and its Aftermath, 20 J. Faro. L. 443, 465 (1982) (the average duration of marriages being
terminated did not decrease after enactment of the Ohio consent divorce statute); Jana B. Singer.
Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 1103 (1989) (response to critics of no-fault who
claim that the no-fault system worsened women's and children's economic condition). But see
Marvell, supra note 9 (no-fault laws in eight states did lead to mote divorces and possibly did in
eight more, but in 58% of states [the remaining studied] these laws did not appreciably increase
divorce rates) and Wardle, supra note 3, at 118, where the author observes, "[lit is apparent that the
significant rise in the divorce rate in the United States did not begin until the no-fault divorce reform
movement was well-underway."
Sepler, supra, at 89, observes that "despite different laws and attitudes concerning divorce, divorce
appears to be a worldwide phenomenon whose direction and control may depend more on
sociological developments than on specific governmental actions."
Even in Marvell, supra note 9, at 565, the author concludes that:
[t]he major issue is whether attempts to legislate morality with the old laws were
completely futile, as evidenced by whether divorce rates rose when the fault provisions
were removed. The answer is that the attempts were not always futile, although they
apparently had become so in most states and in a sizable majority if one excludes the
separate living laws. Also, there is almost no sign of an impact outside the eastern fringe.
17. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution, supra note 3; Fineman, supra note 3; Eekelaar. supra
note 12; Parkman,.supra note 9. But see Jed H. Abraham, The Divorce Revolution Revisited: A
Counter-Revolutionary Critique, 3 Am. J. Fain. L. 87, 108 (1989); Kay, supra note 16; Marsha
Garrison, The Economics of Divorce: Changing Rules, Changing Results, in Divorce Reform at the
Crossroads 75 (Stephen D. Sugarman and Herma H. Kay eds., 1990). In her article An Appraisal
of California's No-Fault Divorce Law, supra note 5, Professor Herma Hill Kay takes issue with the
conclusions of Lenore Weitzman although she concedes that additional legislation is needed to solve
the economic disparities upon divorce.
See Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The hnpact of New York's Equitable
Distribution Law On Divorce Outcomes, 57 Brook. L. Rev. 621, 724-25 (1991) [hereinafter Garrison,
Good Intentions Gone Awry]:
New York has not adopted no-fault divorce except based on mutual consent. The ability
of wives to block a divorce thus remains intact, but it failed to prevent diminished
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inequities do not propose a return to a fault-based divorce system.!' The focus of
the divorce law revision was to reduce state interference in the private decision of
whether one person should remain with another with whom a satisfactory personal
relationship is no longer possible. However, reformers failed to consider the public
consequences of such a private choice.' 9 Increasingly, scholars recognize that
although divorce should be obtainable, a continuing obligation remains to those
former members of the family who are in need of support or to those family
members whose expectations for future prosperity depend upon continuation of the
family unit.
As a consequence of evaluating alternative approaches in light of the
articulated goals and objectives, many proposals were rejected by the committee
or the council because they failed to satisfy one or more of the objectives. The
following discussion recounts some of the policy decisions made by the committee
and council and the disposition of various alternatives proposed.,
C. Elimination of Legal Separation
Although agreement to eliminate fault grounds for divorce was virtually
unanimous among members of the committee and Council of the Law Institute, the
same cannot be said of the elimination of judicial separation.20 The practitioner
members of the committee finally persuaded the other members of the committee
alimony prospects markedly similar to those that have been noted in no-fault divorce
jurisdictions. The rules governing post-divorce entitlements appear to be more important
determinants of divorce outcomes than do divorce grounds.
See also Smith, supra note 12; Rutheford, supra note 12; Martha L. Fineman, Inplementing
Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 789 (1983); Isabel Marcus,
Locked hi and Locked Out: Reflections on the History of Divorce Low Reform in New York State,
37 Buff. L. Rev. 375 (1989); Mary E. O'Connell, Alimony After No-Fault: A Practice in Search of
a Theory, 23 New Eng. L. Rev. 437 (1988); Nora J. Lauerman, A Step Toward Enhancing Equalio',
Choice, and Opportunity to Develop in Marriage and at Divorce, 56 U. Cin. L. Rev. 493 (1987);
McGraw et al., supra note 16; James B. McLindon, Separate but Unequal: The Economic Disaster
of Divorce for Women and Children, 21 Fam. L.Q. 351 (1987); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and
the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reforn, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497 (1983).
18. Not even Lenore Weitzman in her book The Divorce Revolution, supra note 3, necessarily
urges a return to a fault-based system of divorce. Other authors urge mechanisms to guarantee a
fairer sharing of economic resources upon divorce. See, e.g., Rutheford, supra note 12; Kay, supra
note 5; Glendon, supra note 4. Parkman in his book, No-Fault Divorce: What Went Wrong?, supra
note 9, proposes divorce by mutual consent.
Marsha Garrison in Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's Equitable Distribution
Law on Divorce Outcomes, supra note 17, observes, "Legislatures that wish to improve the financial
position of divorced wives would thus be ill-advised to eliminate unilateral no-fault divorce or impose
substantial waiting periods; revision of the rules governing entitlements appears far more likely to
produce the desired results."
19. Wardle, supra note 3, at 119-20. See also sources in supra note 17.
20. For a comparative treatment of judicial separation and such actions as separate maintenance,
legal separation, and divorce from bed and board, see Lynn D. Wardle et al., 2 Contemporary Family
Law § 17.01 (1988).
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and the council that spouses no longer viewed a judicial separation as a means of
accomplishing a permanent or indefinite status (as married but not divorced), even
spouses among the large Catholic population of the state. Unfortunately, by the
1980s a judicial separation had become nothing more than a procedural step in the
process of obtaining a divorce.
The only remaining question to be answered was whether the procedural step
of ajudicial separation served a meaningful purpose, such as a "cooling off" period
during which reconciliation could occur. The members of the committee engaged
in active practice argued that few reconciliations occurred after a judgment of
separation. Therefore, weighed against the other competing policies, including
simplifying procedure to reduce costs to litigants, the committee decided that the
function of providing a "waiting period" before divorce could be served by other,
less costly, mechanisms. Eliminating judicial separation was also resisted by some
attorneys who well understood that doing so would reduce their fees. There were,
of course, other legitimate objections that ranged from the religious,"' to the
psychological,22 to the economic.23
21. Some legislators urged a reconsideration of the elimination of judicial separation on the
ground that many of their religious constituents simply could not file suit for divorce but could file
for a judicial separation.
22. Some legislators argued that a judicial separation permitted the spouse who was resisting
the termination of the marriage relationship to adjust over time to the change in status and to begin
to accept psychologically the new status.
23. Some legislators argued that a judicial separation terminated the community of acquets and
gains before a divorce, permitting the spouses the benefits of such a termination without having to
sue for and obtain a divorce as would be required under the proposed new law.
During the 1992 Regular Session of the Legislature, the legislature enacted La. Civ. Code art. 2374
(1992 La. Acts No. 295, § 1), the article that permits a spouse to obtain a judgment of separation of
property for specific reasons:
When a petition for divorce has been filed, either spouse may obtain a judgment decreeing
separation of property, by a rule to show cause and upon proof that the spouses have lived
separate and apart without reconciliation for thirty days from the date of the filing of the
petition for divorce.
Because there is no requirement that a divorce judgment be rendered, Article 2375 was amended to
provide that should the spouses reconcile, the community regime is re-established (the same effect
as a reconciliation after a judgment of separation from bed and board). The amendment to Article
2375 protected against fraudulent action by one spouse who filed suit for divorce with the sole
intention of ending the community regime, but not necessarily the marriage.
Again in 1993, the legislature amended La. Civ. Code art. 2374 to further liberalize grounds for
separation of property to address the problem of termination of the community without the necessity
of a divorce. La. Civ. Code art. 2374 now reads: "D. When the Spouses have lived separate and
apart continuously for a period of six months, a judgment decreeing separation of property shall be
granted on the petition of either spouse." 1993 La. Acts No. 25, § 1. See also 1993 La. Acts No.
627, § 1.
Requiring a spouse to file suit for divorce to obtain spousal support was cured by amendment to
La. R.S. 9:291 (1991) (1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 6 (effective Jan. 1, 1991)) to permit a spouse
living separate and apart from the other spouse to sue for spousal support, in addition to child
custody and child support.
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D. Consensual Divorce
At the beginning of its deliberations on divorce, the committee proposed
divorce by mutual consent upon the filing of a joint petition and a waiting period
of ninety days.24 Divorce by mutual consent was to be in addition to the option
of unilateral divorce obtained by filing a petition and waiting 180 days.25 The
committee was convinced early in the deliberations that divorce by mutual consent
would satisfy virtually all of its goals and objectives.26 The committee agreed to
restrict the availability of this ground for divorce to couples who had been married
for some minimum time to prevent hasty action during the adjustment period of a
marriage. 7
To fulfill the objective of encouraging spouses to resolve incidental matters
before a judgment of divorce, the proposal imposed a condition upon the "mutual
consent" divorce. Originally, a written implementation plan containing provisions
for custody and support of children, spousal support, injunctive relief, and other
incidental matters had to accompany the petition.2 8  As a part of the original
proposal, the plan was to be binding upon the parties from the date of court
approval. After further deliberation and modification, the proposal required simply
that the plan be presented to the court for its approval before the judgment of
divorce was rendered for incorporation into the judgment.2 ' The plan, under
24. The shorter "cooling off" period of ninety days was a type of reward to the parties for
saving court time by settling incidental matters by agreement and a recognition that, in the consensual
divorce, the chances of reconciliation would be slight.
25. LSLI, materials prepared for Persons Committee meeting on Feb. 24, 1984. at 1. 9.
Article 1: "Spouses who have been married at least one hundred eighty days and who submit an
implementation plan as provided in Chapter 1, Article 2 may jointly petition for divorce."
Article 3: "A divorce shall be granted upon joint motion of the spouses at least ninety days after
the filing of the petition if the court approves the implementation plan ..
26. See discussion in text at supra notes 3-7.
27. The minimum period of marriage for a couple who wished to take advantage of the "mutual
consent" divorce stipulated in the proposal was 180 days. See supra note 25 for the text of proposed
Article 1.
28. A written agreement shall determine, when applicable, custody, visitation, and the
amount of support for minor children of the marriage, the amount of support for a spouse.
use and occupancy of the family home, and use of personal property. In addition, the
agreement may provide for injunctive relief and any other incidental matter referred to in
Chapters [unpublished chapters on file with author].
[The agreement shall be filed with the petition and approved in writing by the court.
When approved, the agreement shall be retroactive to the date on which the petition was
filed and have the effect accorded an executory judgment. The court may refuse to
approve an agreement if it is contrary to the best interests of the family or a spouse.]
LSLI, materials for Persons Committee meeting on October 28, 1983, at I.
29. It [the Persons Committee] rejected the proposed articles on consent divorce, which
would have made the spouses' agreement regarding incidental matters binding on them
from the time of filing. Instead it adopted a scheme wherein spouses who wished to
procure an expedited consent divorce would be required to file an agreed-to "implemen-
tation plan" with their joint divorce petition. This plan, which would have to address all
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either alternative, had to be approved by the court, which retained authority to
refuse approval if the plan was contrary to the best interests of the family or a
spouse.
30
The very title of the proposal, "mutual consent" divorce, necessarily suggested
that spouses could withdraw consent if they had changed their minds or failed to
agree as to incidental matters. Under the proposal, when a spouse withdrew
consent, he or she automatically converted the "mutual consent" divorce into a
"unilateral" divorce requiring the longer waiting period.3 At this point in the
deliberations, members of the committee expressed concern about whether the
proposal on "mutual consent" divorce satisfied the objective of simplifying divorce
procedure.
After further discussion, the committee voted to delete the "mutual consent"
divorce proposal. The majority of the committee members was unwilling to require
that the implementation plan be filed with the petition and be unmodifiable
thereafter.' The committee believed that the ninety-day difference between "mutual
consent" and "unilateral" divorce provided insufficient incentive to spouses to use
of the incidental matters listed in proposed Article 2 of Chapter 1, would not be binding
on the spouses either as a contract or a judgment during the 90-day waiting period prior
to the rendition of the divorce decree. At the time of the rendition of the decree, however,
the implementation plan, together with such modifications as had been agreed to by the
spouses during the waiting period, would be incorporated into the judgment of the court,
and its dispositions would then become permanently binding upon the parties.
Id. at 3.
Article 1. Spouses who have been married at least one hundred eighty days and who
submit an implementation plan as provided in Chapter 1, Article 2 may jointly petition
for divorce.
LSLI, materials prepared for Persons Committee meeting on Feb. 24, 1984, at I.
Article 2. The implementation plan shall be filed with the petition and shall determine,
when applicable, custody, visitation, and support for minor children of the marriage: the
support for a spouse; the use and occupancy of the family home; and the use of personal
property. In addition, the agreement may provide for injunctive relief and any other
incidental matter referred to in Chapters [unpublished chapters on file with author].
Id. at 7.
Article 3. A divorce shall be granted upon joint motion of the spouses at least ninety
days after the filing of the petition if the court approves the implementation plan.
Id. at 9.
30. Article 3. The spouses may modify the implementation plan after the filing of the
petition and before its approval by the court. The implementation plan when approved
shall be [included in] the judgment of divorce. The court may refuse to approve an
implementation plan if it is contrary to the best interests of the family or a spouse.
LSLI, materials prepared for Persons Committee meeting on Feb. 24, 1984, at 9.
31. Article 4. A spouse may withdraw consent to the divorce and implementation plan.
The court shall grant the motion withdrawing consent to the divorce. Fifteen days from
service of the motion withdrawing consent either spouse may obtain a divorce under
Chapter 2, Article I (or under the provisions of Chapter 3, Article I). The time which
has elapsed from the filing of the joint petition shall be considered as having elapsed
under Chapter 2, Article 1.
Id. at 13. See infra text pp. 34-35 for a description of "unilateral" divorce.
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the "mutual consent" provisions. Furthermore, permitting withdrawal of consent
to the divorce or plan before judgment, thus converting the action to one for
"unilateral" divorce, failed to simplify divorce procedure.3 2
E. Divorce of Couples with Minor Children
Influenced by the work of two preeminent scholars, Professors Judith Younger
and Mary Ann Glendon,33 the committee proposed to the Council of the Law
Institute a special provision for the divorce of spouses with minor children. The
proposal was intended to satisfy one of the two primary goals of the divorce law
revision-to assure that the adverse after-effects of divorce were reduced,
particularly for the innocent parties, the children.34 The committee decided to
propose a special article for the divorce of couples with minor children after
weighing two of the principal conflicting interests: the welfare and stability of the
child against the state's interest in speedy resolution of disputes. Members of the
committee originally expressed concern that requiring the parties to agree on
dispositions relating to the child (custody and support) as a precondition to divorce
32. LSLI, minutes of Council meeting on March 22-23, 1985, at 3, contains the following
explanation of the rejection of "mutual consent" divorce:
The Reporter introduced this chapter by saying that it represented the result of many
months of deliberations by the Marriage-Persons Committee .... The Committee had
... decided to adopt a no-fault scheme with two tracks: one for consent divorce, under
which a judgment could be gotten after a waiting period of only three months if the
spouses agreed on all of the incidental issues raised by the divorce; and another track for
the situation in which only one of the spouses wanted to be divorced, which would take
six months. The Reporter explained that after further consideration the Committee had
decided that the three months' difference in the two waiting periods would not have been
sufficiently large to encourage spouses to take the consent route, and so had decided to
provide only one form of divorce action-the unilateral action provided for in the
document.
33. Professor Judith Younger teaches at University of Minnesota Law School and Professor
Mary Ann Glendon at Harvard University Law School. Their works include Judith T. Younger,
Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, Together with Criticism and
Suggestions for Reform, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 45 (1981); Glendon, supra note 4. See also Mary A.
Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law (1987).
In a more recent piece, Judith Younger, now the Joseph E. Wargo Anoka County Bar Association
Professor of Family Law, reurges the idea of a "marriage for the benefit of minor children" (to
encourage living arrangements which are good for raising children) governed by special rules
including "grounds for divorce." See Judith T. Younger, Light Thoughts and Night Thoughts on the
American Family, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 891 (1992).
See also Linda J. Lacey, Mandatory Marriage "For the Sake of the Children ": A Feminist Reply
to Elizabeth Scott, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 1435 (1992). The article is a reply to Elizabeth Scott, Ratiomal
Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 Va. L. Rev. 9 (1990), whose work is heavily
influenced by the articles of Professors Glendon and Younger.
34. Wardle, supra note 3, at 136: "There are compelling reasons to consider four kinds of
reform to contemporary no-fault divorce laws; modem divorce laws should . . . (4) require parents
to postpone (or provide mandatory, protective legal procedures for) major legal family adjustments
that may be severely detrimental to the psychological and economic well-being of their children."
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would frustrate the state's interest in resolution of disputes by giving a spouse who
did not want the divorce a means of delaying it indefinitely. Other members
countered that expressed concern by arguing that the importance of providing for
the children justified such delays. The compromise crafted between the two
positions permitted the divorcing parents to agree to a decision on custody and
support or to request such relief from the court.
The proposal submitted to the Council of the Law Institute was modest35 in
comparison to either Professor Younger's special marital status for "marriages with
minor children" or Professor Glendon's "children-first" principle of marital
property division. Under the former, the couple could obtain a divorce only if they
convinced the court that "continuing the marriage would cause either or both
spouses exceptional hardship and would harm their minor children more than the
divorce."'  Both Professors Glendon and Younger37 proposed that the division
of marital property depend upon whether or not the divorcing couple had minor
children. For example, in Professor Glendon's hypothetical "marriage with minor
children," she urged that a category of "family property" be recognized and its
distribution be dependent upon assuring the welfare of the children and their
custodian.38 Even though Professors Younger and Glendon wrote their articles in
the early to middle 1980s, one other author since then has proposed a constitutional
amendment prohibiting divorce for couples with children under the age of twenty-
one.39
35. See discussion of the specific proposal infra text at notes 40-43.
36. Younger, supra note 33, at 90: "It would enable the courts to explore the possible effects
of the divorce on the children, an inquiry they do not make under current law. Children's interests
would become a crucial factor not only in deciding custody, but also in deciding their parents' rights
to divorce."
37. Existing judicial powers to grant alimony and child support to dependent family
members would be expanded for marriages with minor children to allow the courts to
order continuation of the economic partnership between ex-spouses in the children's
interest. A divorcing court could thus delay ultimate property division between parents
until all the children reached eighteen. The more difficult divorce standard and the
immutable partnership rules would apply during the minority of all children. Thereafter,
the couple could divorce as easily as couples without minor children and alter their
economic relations by agreement if they chose.
Id. at 91 (footnote omitted).
38. This principle [children-first] rests on a notion that most people in our society
probably would accept: the fact of having children impresses a lien upon all of the
parents' income and property to the extent necessary to provide for the children's decent
subsistence at least until those children reach the age of majority.
Glendon, supra note 4, at 1559.
Another author who urges adoption of Professor Glendon's approach is Arthur B. Cornell, Jr.,
in When Two Become One, and Then Come Undone: An Organizational Approach to Marriage and
Its Implications for Divorce Law, 26 Fain. L.Q. 103, 138 (1992).
39. Christopher Lasch, in Gerald Mazorati et al., Who Owes What to Whom?, Harper's Mag.,
Feb. 1991, at 47-48. See also Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an
Age of Diminishing Expectations (1978).
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The committee proposed a modest limitation on the ability of spouses to
divorce if they had a minor child of the marriage. The proposed article required
that a judicial determination of custody and support for the child be made before
rendition of the divorce judgment.40 With an abbreviated divorce process
available to either spouse, the proposed article furthered the policy of requiring
couples with minor children to adopt dispositions for the custody4 and support of
their children before obtaining a divorce. The official comments to the article
explained the provision as a statement of the court's basic obligation to assure that
provision is made for the children of the marriage 2 and, more importantly, that
it is made before rendition of the divorce judgment."
Although the Council of the Law Institute originally approved the proposal in
principle and recommitted it to the committee for redrafting, the council ultimately
rejected the proposal. By the time that the proposal was presented to the council
for the second time, the council had adopted as an additional no-fault ground for
divorce living separate and apart for one year. Thus, the council members reasoned
that arrangements for the child or children would have to have been made by the
parties or the court because the parties were required to live separate and apart. By
contrast, under the committee's original proposal for divorce, the only ground for
divorce was a filing of the petition for divorce and a waiting period of 180 days
without the requirement that the spouses live separate and apart during that period.
Therefore, the council concluded that the article served no purpose.44
Both works are cited in Lacey, supra note 33. Elizabeth Scott's work to which the article in
Harper's is a response is entitled, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 Va. L.
Rev. 9 (1990).
40. "Good cause" according to comment (d) of Article 3 "is left to be settled by the courts in
light of the purpose of the article, which is to give precedence to the interests of children in the
divorce process." LSLI, materials prepared for Council meeting on May 10, 1985, at 9.
41. Originally, the proposal also included provisions concerning visitation, but when the
proposal was submitted to the council for the second time, the committee had deleted references to
visitation.
42. Article 3:
If there is a minor child of the marriage, a court may not render a divorce .. without a
judicial determination of custody and support for the child, except for good cause shown.
LSLI, materials prepared for Council meeting on May 10, 1985, at 8.
Article 3, cmt. (b):
... A similar imperative was stated in Civil Code Article 157 (1982) ("in all cases of
separation and divorce ... custody shall be granted ...."), but it apparently was never
acknowledged in the holding of any case, perhaps because the use of the passive voice
in that article obscured the fact that the court was the person to whom the imperative was
directed. But see Griffith v. Roy, 263 La. 712, 269 So. 2d 217, 221 (1972) (dictum:
"court is empowered, perhaps mandated, to determine the custody of the minor
children ....").
Id. (emphasis added).
43. Id. Article 3, cmt. (c).
44. Another objection raised by the council to the proposal when it was first introduced was
that the requirement would create a new ground for nullifying a judgment of divorce. See La. Code




The original proposal of the committee revising divorce law contained only
one no-fault ground for divorce:
A divorce shall be granted upon motion of a spouse when: That
spouse has filed a petition for divorce; and One hundred eighty days have
elapsed from the service of the petition.
The motion shall be a rule to show cause filed after the one hundred
eighty days have elapsed.
Although the article bears some resemblance to present Louisiana Civil Code article
102, there are important differences.45 First, the proposed article did not require
that the spouses live separate and apart during the 180-day waiting period. The
committee's view, ultimately accepted by the council but not the legislature, was
that the requirement of living separate and apart served no useful purpose and in
fact had the disadvantage of impeding reconciliation.
In the original proposal, because the article did not require the spouses to live
separate and apart, service of the petition and the motion had to be by personal
service,46 rather than domiciliary service. Personal service assured that the
petitioning spouse could not receive service for the defendant and thus prevent
knowledge by the defendant of the action for divorce. For the same reason, the
committee concluded that it was necessary to inform the spouse served that the suit
was for divorce and that he or she could claim certain incidental relief, all in terms
a layperson could understand.47
Secondly, under the proposed article only the petitioning spouse could seek a
divorce after the 180-day waiting period. The nonpetitioning spouse could not
utilize the action initiated by the petitioning spouse; he could only file his own
proposed Article 3 provided that a divorce judgment should not be declared null for failure to comply
with the article. LSLI, materials prepared for Council meeting on May 10, 1985, at 9.
45. Even earlier in the deliberations, the committee had proposed a mechanism to encourage
agreement as to incidental matters in a "unilateral" divorce. The provision read as follows:
Upon filing of the petition, a spouse may request by motion the determination of
custody and support of minor children of the marriage, support for a spouse, injunctive
relief, use and occupancy of the family home, and any other incidental matter.
The court on its own motion or upon the motion of a spouse may direct the spouses and
their attorneys to appear for a conference to consider the possibility of agreement as to
any of the incidental matters. [The court may designate a person to conduct the
conference.] After the conference, the court shall render an order which contains the
agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters considered at the conference.
(As edited at the meeting.) LSLI, materials prepared for Persons Committee meeting on April 8.
1983, at 16B.
Ultimately, the committee rejected the express provision.
46. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1314, eliminating service by mail under La. Code Civ. P. art. 1313.
47. These notices accompanying service of the petition and the rule to show cause were copied
from the notices for small claims court (La. R.S. 13:5204 (1991)) and presently appear in La. R.S.
13:3491-92 (1991).
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action by means of a reconventional demand."' The committee reasoned that the
action was intended to reflect the petitioning spouse's initial desire to divorce and
the continuance of that desire for the entire waiting period. To permit the
nonpetitioning spouse to file the motion for divorce would circumvent the policy
of guaranteeing that the spouse who filed the petition desired to obtain a divorce for
the entire six-month period. Furthermore, without the requirement that the spouses
live separate and apart during the waiting period, the court would be relying for
proof of the desire to divorce exclusively upon the spouse's assertions in the
petition and the subsequent motion.
G. Organization of Title
Even though the legislature did not pass some chapters and sections of the
divorce revision package in 1990,'9 the Law Institute rearranged Book I, Title V
(Divorce), which contains the substantive provisions regulating the termination of
marriage by divorce and the incidental proceedings in such an action. The
restructuring resulted in the following organization: chapter 1, "The Divorce
Action"; chapter 2, "Provisional and Incidental Proceedings" (alimony, claims for
contributions to a spouse's education or training, child custody, and child support);
and chapter 3, "Effects of Divorce." The structure of the reorganization was
identical to that of Title V, which was incorporated in the Law Institute bill as
introduced with proposals for revision of the law ori spousal support, child custody,
and child support. 50
All of the rather detailed provisions on the other incidental proceedings, such
as injunctive relief, use and occupancy of the family home, and use of personal
property,5 were transferred to the Louisiana Revised Statutes and reorganized in
a logical pattern.52 The corresponding book and title in the Louisiana Revised
Statutes, (Code Book I, Code Title V) contains the ancillary provisions on divorce.
The remainder of the reorganization of the Louisiana Revised Statutes into discrete
chapters on spousal support, child custody, and child support await the enactment
of the remainder of the Law Institute's revision.3
H. Provisions on Alimony, Child Custody, and Child Support
Part of the original Law Institute package of bills revising Title V of Book I
included articles on spousal support, child custody, and child support. Principally,
48. An action for divorce under La. Civ. Code art. 102 is an exception to the defense of lis
pendens. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 3955.
49. See discussion infra text at Part 1, Section H.
50. See discussion of the Law Institute proposal infra text at Part I, Section H.
51. See the rather exhaustive list in La. Civ. Code an. 105. which was intended to be introduc-
tory to Chapter 2, and related provisions of the Civil Code Ancillaries (La. R.S. Title 9).
52. La. R.S. 9:371-375 (1991) (Code Title V-Divorce, Pan V).
53. See discussion infra text at Part 1, Section H.
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the proposed articles on spousal support and child custody addressed the document-
ed disparate impact of no-fault divorce on women and children.54 The Law
Institute approach of addressing the impact of no-fault divorce on women and
children through the law of support has been urged by at least one author, who
observed that "[li]egislatures that wish to improve the financial position of divorced
wives would thus be ill-advised to eliminate unilateral no-fault divorce or impose
substantial waiting periods; revision of the rules governing entitlements appears far
more likely to produce the desired results.""5
In an effort to improve the position of women in need at divorce, the Law
Institute proposed that fault of the recipient be eliminated as an absolute bar to
receipt of support after divorce.5 The proposal substituted comparative "marital
misconduct" of the parties for "fault" of the recipient as a discretionary factor for
the court to consider in deciding the "entitlement, amount and duration" of final
periodic support.5 7 "Marital misconduct" under the proposed legislation was
54. See supra notes 3-19 and accompanying text.
Although not directly concerned with the impact of no-fault divorce on the economic situation of
women and children, Marsha Garrison's article, Good Intentions Gone Awry, supra note 17, considers
the unintentional effect on divorced wives of the reform of New York's equitable distribution (of
marital property) and rehabilitative alimony laws.
55. Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry. supra note 17, at 725.
56. La. Civ. Code art. 111:
The court must consider all relevant factors in determining the entitlement, amount, and
duration of final support. Those factors may include:
(1) The needs of the parties;
(2) The income and means of the parties, including the liquidity of such means;
(3) The financial obligations of the parties;
(4) The earning capacity of the parties;
(5) The effect of custody of children upon a party's earning capacity;
(6) The time necessary for the claimant to acquire appropriate education, training, or
employment;
(7) The health, age, and physical and emotional condition of the parties;
(8) The standard of living of the parties during the marriage;
(9) The duration of the marriage;
(10) The tax consequences to either or both parties; and
(11) The comparative marital misconduct, if any, of the parties.
The term "marital misconduct" as used in this Article means any substantial act or
omission that violates a spouse's marital duties or responsibilities.
H.R. 1102, Regular Sess. (1990) (emphasis added).
The same proposal was contained in La. Civ. Code art. 112 as introduced during the 1993
legislative session, H.R. 963, Regular Sess. (1993), but the bill was deferred by the House Committee
on Civil Law and Procedure.
57. La. Civ. Code art. 11l cmt. (b):
This Article changes the law governing the effect of marital misconduct on a spouse's
claim for support. Under the prior law misconduct that rose to the level of one of the
then-existing fault grounds for divorce or legal separation operated as a bar to the guilty
spouse's receiving post-divorce support .... Under this Article, by contrast, misconduct
is only one of eleven factors that may be considered by the court in deciding the
entitlement to and amount of spousal support, and the comparative misconduct of both
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defined as "any substantial act or omission that violates a spouse's marital duties
or responsibilities."58 In addition, two new factors added for consideration in
determining entitlement to and amount of support promised the possibility of
greater economic parity between the parties-duration of the marriage59 and
standard of living enjoyed by the parties during the marriage. 60 The proposal
prohibited the extinction of the spousal support obligation by consent unless an
action for divorce was pending or the judgment of divorce rendered. 6' Further-
more, the consensual extinction of the obligation of spousal support had to be in a
particular form with court approval.62 . Regulating consensual extinction63 of the
spouses is to be considered, not merely that of the spouse who seeks support.
Nevertheless, the court still has the discretion to find, in an appropriate case, that marital
misconduct of one spouse is sufficiently serious to operate as a complete bar to any award
of spousal support to that spouse.
H.R. 1102, Regular Sess. (1990).
58. La. Civ. Code art. 111, H.R. 1102 Regular Sess. (1990). The statutory definition roughly
corresponds to the definition of fault for purposes of alimony after divorce under La. Civ. Code art.
160 (rev. 1982 & 1986; now La. Civ. Code art. 112 (1991)) in Felger v. Doty. 217 La. 365. 366. 46
So. 2d 300, 301 (1950), cited in Smith v. Smith. 216 So. 2d 391, 394 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
59. Comment (f) to proposed La. Civ. Code art. I I 1 explains this factor as one that permits the
court to consider "the degree to which a spouse's habituation to dependency during the marriage has
impaired his earning capacity." H.R. 1102, Regular Sess. (1990).
60. This factor represented a change in the law. The measure of permanent alimony under La.
Civ. Code art. 112 is whether the recipient has insufficient means for her support. Support, by
contrast to maintenance in La. Civ. Code art. Il1, encompasses the necessities (food, clothing,
shelter) and conveniences of life (reasonable and necessary automobile expenses, medical and drug
expenses, utilities, household expenses, and the income tax liability generated by the alimony
payments made to the former wife) unfettered by a consideration of the standard of living of the
parties during marriage. See Bernhardt v. Bernhardt. 283 So. 2d 226, 229 (La. 1973), cited in
Loyacano v. Loyacano, 358 So. 2d 304, 310 (La. 1978), judgment vacated Loycano v. Leblanc, 440
U.S. 952, 99 S. Ct. 1488 (1979).
Comment (e) to proposed Article I 11, explained the change in law as follows:
It changes the law by permitting the court to consider more than just the cost of
"necessities" in setting the amount of spousal support.... This change reflects one of
the purposes of spousal support awards under this revision, which is to do justice by
equitably allocating the economic advantages secured by the parties during the marriage.
This factor appears in the spousal support statutes of a number of other states. E.g.. Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 61.08 (West 1992); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3105.1B (Baldwin 1992).
H.R. 1102, Regular Sess. (1990).
61. La. Civ. Code art. 115: "The obligation of spousal support may not be extinguished by
consent unless an action for divorce is pending or a judgment of divorce has been rendered." H.R.
1102, Regular Sess. (1990). See also La. Civ. Code art, 116 in H.R. 963, Regular Sess. (1993).
62. La. Civ. Code art. 115 continues:
That consent must be expressed in an authentic act or act under private signature duly
acknowledged by the obligee, and the act must receive court approval. The court must
approve the act if it finds that the obligee understands the legal consequences of extinction
of the obligation.
H.R. 1102, Regular Sess. (1990). See also La. Civ. Code art. 116 in H.R. 963, Regular Sess. (1993).
See also comment (c) to Article 115 explaining judicial approval of the consensual extinction as
requiring that the same proof be elicited as that required under La. Civ. Code art. 2329 for the
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obligation assured that the agreement would be entered when the spouses could
have information about conditions affecting future need 64 and would by the
solemnities of form and court approval "impress upon the affected spouse the
seriousness of the step about to be taken. 63
The Law Institute proposal revising the Civil Code articles on child custody
and child support accomplished the principal purposes of (1) creating legislative
authority in the Civil Code for the award of child support in connection with a
divorce proceeding,6 (2) providing a "domiciliary parent" model for a joint
custody implementation plan in the absence of court modification, and (3)
adding the factor of the child's "primary caretaker" to the list of factors to be
considered in deciding what custody arrangement is in the best interest of the
child.6' In addition, the proposed revision of the law of custody and child support
approval of matrimonial agreements. H.R. 1102, Regular Sess. (1990). See also La. Civ. Code an.
116 in H.R. 963, Regular Sess. (1993).
63. Comment (f) to La. Civ. Code art. 115: "This Article does not apply to an agreement that
fixes, modifies, or otherwise imposes conditions or limitations on spousal support that do not amount
to a present or future extinguishment of it." H.R. 1102, Regular Sess. (1990). See also La. Civ.
Code art. 116 in H.R. 963. Regular Sess. (1993).
64. See Holliday v. Holliday, 358 So. 2d 618 (La. 1978).
65. Comment (e) to La. Civ. Code art. 115. H.R. 1102, Regular Sess. (1990). See also La.
Civ. Code art. 116 in H.R. 963, Regular Sess. (1993).
66. La. Civ. Code arts. 136-137. H.R. 1105, Regular Sess. (1990).
Even though the child support guidelines presently appear in the Civil Code Ancillaries (under
Code Title V-Divorce, Chapter 1. Divorce-Part 1. In General and Part I-A. Guidelines for
Determination of Child Support), there are no corresponding Civil Code articles in Title V-Of
Divorce, Chapter 2 (Provisional and Incidental Proceedings). Only La. Civ. Code art. 131 mentions
child support in connection with a joint custody implementation plan.
Authority in the Civil Code for the award of child support in a divorce proceeding rested on the
provisions in Chapter 5 (Of Parental Authority) of Title VII (Of Father and Child) of Book I. See
La. Civ. Code arts. 224, 227, and 230-34.
67. La. R.S. 9:335(B). 1993 La. Acts No. 261, § 5, contains the Law Institute proposal on
child custody originally introduced in 1990 which will take effect on Jan. 1, 1994:
(1) In a decree of joint custody the court shall designate a domiciliary parent except when
there is an implementation order to the contrary or for other good cause shown.
(2) The domiciliary parent is the parent with whom the child shall primarily reside, but
the other parent shall have physical custody during time periods that assure that the child
has frequent and continuing contact with both parents.
(3) The domiciliary parent shall have authority to make all decisions affecting the child
unless an implementation order provides otherwise. All major decisions made by the
domiciliary parent concerning the child shall be subject to review by the court upon
motion of the other parent. It shall be presumed that all major decisions made by the
domiciliary parent are in the best interest of the child.
See also La. R.S. 9:341(B), H.R. 1105, Regular Sess. (1990).
68. La. Civ. Code art. 134 (as amended by 1993 La. Acts No. 261, § I. effective Jan. I. 1994):
"The court shall consider all relevant factors in determining the best interest of the child. Such
factors may include: .. . (12) The responsibility for the care and rearing of the child previously
exercised by each party."
See comment (i) to Article 134 (citing Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W.Va. 1981)) and
Richard Neely. The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and The Dynanfics of Greed,
[Vol. 54
LOUISIANA 'S NEW DIVORCE LEGISLATION
organized the Louisiana Revised Statutes (Civil Code Ancillaries) in a pattern
corresponding to the organizational structure of the Civil Code's chapters and
sections.
In 1990 the Law Institute package revising the law of divorce and its incidental
proceedings consisted of eight separate bills introduced in the House of Representa-
tives and referred to the House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure. Four of
the bills received a hearing by the committee-the revision of actions for divorce,
the revision of claims for contributions to a spouse's education, the addition of
express provisions governing incidental matters in actions for nullity of mar-
riage,69 and the "housekeeping" revision of other statutory provisions necessitated
by the elimination of judicial separation. All four bills were reported favorably by
the House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure, and all but one, the bill on
incidental proceedings in an action for nullity of marriage, passed the House of
Representatives. The other four bi!ls concerning spousal support, child custody,
and child support were never heard by the House Committee on Civil Law and
Procedure. Because all eight bills originally had been a coordinated revision of the
law of divorce, failure to pass part of the proposed legislation, especially the
revision of spousal support, created problems.
The ability to obtain a divorce judgment by rule to show cause 180 days after
service of a petition created the possibility of termination of alimony pendente lite
with the judgment of divorce before a hearing could be held on the rule to
determine permanent periodic alimony. The judiciary faced the unpleasant choice
upon divorce of terminating support to a needy and "worthy" spouse (one who
would be awarded permanent alimony) or extending alimony pendente lite until a
hearing on the rule to set permanent alimony, unauthorized by the legislation as
interpreted by the jurisprudence. The proposed Law Institute revision of the
spousal support law eliminated the dilemma by permitting the award of an "interim
allowance" (virtually identical to alimony pendente lite) only when a claim for
final, periodic support was pending, which could occur at any time after the petition
for divorce was filed. 70 The interim allowance did not terminate upon divorce, but
upon a judicial determination of whether to grant or to deny the request for final,
periodic support.
3 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 168 (1984). See also La. Civ. Code art. 133. H.R. 110 5. Regular Sess.
(1990).
69. H.R. 1107, Regular Sess. (1990). The substance of this House bill was enacted during the
1993 Legislative Session. See 1993 La. Acts No. 108, § 1.
70. See La. Civ. Code arts. 110-112 in H.R. 1102, Regular Sess. (1990).
La. Civ. Code art. 112: "When a demand for final support is pending, the court may award a party
an interim allowance based on the needs of that party, the ability of the other party to pay, and the
standard of living of the parties during the marriage." Id. (emphasis added). See also La. Civ. Code
art. 113, H.R. 963, Regular Sess. (1993).
See, e.g., Moody v. Moody, 618 So. 2d 1005 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1993) and Champion v. Champion.
618 So. 2d 1182 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied. 620 So. 2d 850 (1993).
19931
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
During the 1993 legislative session, the legislature enacted the Law Institute
proposals on child custody, child support, and incidental proceedings in a nullity
action originally introduced in 1990.7' The Law Institute proposal on revision of
the law of spousal support did not fare as well;7 1 the House Committee on Civil
Law and Procedure voted to defer the measure. In summary, the entire package of
bills originally proposed as a revision of Title V of Book I has been enacted, except
for one bill-the revision of the law of spousal support. The proposed changes to
the law of spousal support described previously in this article 73 are more contro-
versial because they concern economic issues between the two spouses, including
the possibility of more former spouses being obligated to pay and the enlarged class
of obligors paying more.
I. Claims for Contributions to a Spouse's Education
The legislature replaced one Louisiana Civil Code article on claims for
contributions to a spouse's education 74 with four new ones. Two of the articles
substituted for former Article 161 contain new provisions that are described as a
clarification of the law. 75 Louisiana Civil Code article 122 explicitly provides that
the claim for contributions is strictly personal as to both the obligor and the
obligee.76 Article 123 permits the court to structure the award for contributions
made to the education of a spouse in the form of a sum certain payable in
71. 1993 La. Acts Nos. 108 and 261.
72. H.R. 963, Regular Sess. (1993).
73. See discussion of proposed changes in supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
74. La. Civ. Code art. 161 (as enacted by 1986 La. Acts No. 780, § I):
A. In a proceeding for a legal separation, declaration of nullity of a marriage, or divorce.
or in a separate proceeding, the court may allow a party a sum for financial contributions
made to the education, training, or increased earning power of the other party to the extent
that the contributing party has not previously benefited by such education. training, or
increased earning power. The sum awarded for such contributions may be in addition to
a sum for support and to property received in the partition of the community property.
B. Any claim for contributions made in accordance with provisions of Paragraph A of
this Article prescribes three years from the date of judgment of declaration of nullity of
the marriage or judgment of divorce.
75. See La. Civ. Code arts. 122, cmt. (a) (effective Jan. 1, 1991) and 123, cmt. (a) (effective
Jan. 1, 1991).
76. La. Civ. Code art. 122 (effective Jan. 1, 1991): "The claim for contributions made to the
education or training of a spouse is strictly personal to each party."
Comment (a) to Article 122 explains that the article is new and comment (b) explains the
consequences of the claim being personal: "Under this Article and Civil Code Articles 1765 and
1766, the obligation recognized by this Section is neither transferable nor heritable prior to being
reduced to judgment. Under this Article and Code of Civil Procedure Article 428, a pending action
under this Section abates when either spouse dies." La. Civ. Code art. 122, cmt. (b).
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installments that does not terminate upon remarriage or death of either party.77
Comment (b) explains the motive for enacting Article 123:
[t]his Section contemplates an award that will tend to be greater the earlier
it is made in the defendant's career, because of the importance of the
"realized benefit" factor .... Thus, a mechanism is needed whereby the
award can be structured so as to shift some of its cost from the judgment
debtor's early working years to his later, more productive ones.
8
Louisiana Civil Code article 124 retains the prescriptive period for asserting the
claim for contributions originally found in Article 16 ]-three years from the date
of signing the judgment of divorce.79
Although the substantive elements of the claim contained in Louisiana Civil
Code article 121 appear virtually identical to those of its predecessor, the bill
originally introduced on recommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute
contained a limitation on the amount of the award not found in former Article 161.
As originally introduced, Article 121 limited the amount that could be awarded to
a sum not to exceed a spouse's financial contributions made to the education or
training of the other spouse. s° In an article written after the enactment of Article
161 in 1986, the author speculated about the possibility that the sum awarded could
be a proportion of the other spouse's increased earning power.8 ' The Law
77. La. Civ. Code art. 123, cmt. (c) (effective Jan. 1, 1991):
A judgment under this Article is still a money judgment for a specified sum, not an open-
ended award. Thus a judgment under this Article is similar to a spousal support award
in only two ways: (1) It is payable periodically; and (2) it may be enforced by an action
to make past-due installments executory under Code of Civil Procedure Article 3945 (rev.
1990). It is not, like a spousal support award, modifiable in light of changed circumstanc-
es, and under the second sentence of this Article it is not terminated by the death or
remarriage of either party.
78. La. Civ. Code art. 123, cmt. (b) (effective Jan. 1, 1991).
79. La. Civ. Code art. 124 (effective Jan. 1, 1991). See also the comment to Article 124.
80. For a comprehensive treatment of the meaning of the language of Article 161 (1986)
(repealed, effective Jan. 1, 1991), the predecessor of La. Civ. Code art. 121 (1990 La. Acts No. 1108.
§ 2, effective Jan. 1. 1991), see Katherine S. Spaht, Persons and Matrimonial Regimes. Developments
in the Law, 1985-1986, 47 La. L. Rev. 391 (1986). The article explores the background of the
proposal for permitting a claim for contributions to the education of a spouse and examines the
language of the statutory provision (Article 161). which is virtually identical to that of La. Civ. Code
art. 121.
81. A persuasive argument may be made that article 161 permits an award in excess of
the "financial" contributions of the contributing spouse. Rather than directing the court
in its discretion to award the contributing party his financial contributions only, the article
permits the court to "allow a party a sum for financial contributions made to the
education ... of the other party." A prerequisite to the claim is a spouse's financial
contribution, but the award is a sum that is not expressly limited to the contributions. The
quoted language suggests the possibility of prorating the increased earning power of the
supported spouse according to the proportion that the financial contributions bear to the
total cost of the education. The task of quantification of increased earning power is not
easy, but not impossible.
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Institute intended to end speculation, limiting the claim to no more than the
spouse's financial contributions.
The bill as introduced, with the limitation on the sum that could be awarded,
passed the House of Representatives and the Senate Committee on Judiciary A.
However, on the floor of the Senate during the debate of the bill, an amendment
passed that stripped the limitation from the article, thereby clearly evidencing
legislative intent to permit the judge the latitude to award either a sum equal only
to the financial contributions of the spouse or a sum representing a proportionate
part of the supported spouse's increased earning power or some amount in
between."8
J. Transitional Provisions
The elimination of legal separation, not to mention the myriad fault grounds
for its rendition," created the necessity for rather detailed transitional provisions.
The committee determined that it was unnecessary to retain the procedure for
obtaining a judicial separation, but it was necessary to retain present law on the
effects of legal separation in the interest of those spouses who were judicially
separated." The committee rejected the repeal of the entire law governing legal
Spaht, supra note 80, at 396-97 (footnote omitted).
82. A description of the legislative history appears in Robert A. Pascal & Katherine S. Spaht,
Louisiana Family Law Course 302 (6th ed. 1992):
In the legislative history of the amendment and reenactment of Article 161 (which became
Articles 121-124) there is evidence of legislative intent that the claimant not be restricted
to recovery of only his or her financial contributions. The bill as originally introduced
contained a ceiling (no more than his/her contributions) but the language creating the
ceiling was stripped from the bill on the Senate floor. Now it is possible under Article
121 to seek an award which represents a percentage of the increased earning power of the
recipient.
83. But see La. Civ. Code art. 138 (1870) (repealed Jan. I, 1991).
For an example of the type of problem created by elimination of fault grounds, see Mathews v.
Mathews, 614 So. 2d 1287 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993); Currier v. Currier, 599 So, 2d 456 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1992); Wicker v. Wicker, 597 So. 2d 1273 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992). See also discussion of the
issue in Christopher L. Blakesley, Louisiana Family Law § 15.27 at 15-43 (1993).
84. La. R.S. 9:382 (effective Jan. 1, 1991):
A judgment of separation from bed and board or divorce rendered before January I, 1991,
or a judgment rendered in an action governed by R.S. 9:381, shall have the same effect
that it had prior to January 1, 1991. These effects include, but are not limited to:
(1) Spouses who are judicially separated shall retain that status until either
reconciliation or divorce.
La. R. S. 9:384 (effective Jan. 1, 1991):
A. If spouses who were judicially separated by a judgment signed before January I,
1991, or by a judgment rendered in an action governed by R.S. 9:381, reconcile, their
community of acquets and gains shall be reestablished between the spouses, as of the date
of filing of the original petition in the action in which the separation judgment was
rendered, unless the spouses execute prior to the reconciliation a matrimonial agreement
that the community will not be reestablished upon reconciliation. This matrimonial
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separation and the substitution of a single provision continuing the effect of prior
law on the consequences of legal separation. 5 Instead, the committee adopted the
approach of multiple provisions specifically addressing individual effects of a legal
separation. Because of the importance of the subject matter and the need for
clarity, and for the convenience of the bench and bar,86 the committee decided that
the transitional provisions should be incorporated in the Louisiana Revised Statutes
rather than in separate sections of the act itself.
When the transitional provisions were drafted, revisions to the law of spousal
support eliminated fault as an absolute bar to its award.87 The committee
members were particularly sensitive to the reasonable expectations of parties who
had filed suit for separation or divorce before the new law became effective. The
parties' expectations could include the effect on permanent alimony of a legal
separation on the grounds of fault, 8 the elimination of fault as an absolute bar to
a claim for alimony, and the effect of judicial findings of freedom from fault under
pre-1991 law.8 9 Therefore, the transitional provisions addressed actions for
agreement shall not require court approval.
B. Reestablishment of a community property regime under the provisions of this
Section shall be effective toward third persons only upon filing notice of the reestablish-
ment for registry in accordance with the provisions of Civil Code Article 2332. The
reestablishment of the community shall not prejudice the rights of third persons validly
acquired prior to filing notice of the reestablishment nor shall it affect a prior community
property partition between the spouses.
85. The result of this decision was not to eliminate all references in the law to legal separation,
but rather to retain each reference to legal separation that concerned its effect, rather than the
procedure for obtaining a separation.
The list of the statutory provisions that remained untouched by the legislation in 1990 because they
pertained to the effect of a separation includes: La. Civ. Code arts. 221. 250, 258, 355. 880, 894.
895, 896, 902, 2367.1; La. Code Civ. P. arts. 683, 732, 3992, 4031, 4501; Code Juv. P. arts. 13(11),
51; La. R.S. 4:150 (1987), 6:763(b) (1986), 8:655 (1986), 8:659 (1986), 9:422.4 (1965). 9:571 (1965),
9:572 (1965), 13:1140(b) (1983), 13:1401 (1983), 14:41(c) (1986), 26:80(a)(9) (1989), 33:2141(7)
(1988). 33:2176(1) (1988), 33:2385.8(G) (1988), 40:1299.58.5(A)(2)(b) (1985). Some of those
statutory provisions have been altered since 1990 but not by the new divorce revision. (1990 La. Acts
No. 1009, effective Jan. 1, 1991).
One effect of a judgment of separation from bed and board-re-establishment of the community
regime after reconciliation of the spouses-was explicitly incorporated into the transitional provisions
in the Revised Statutes (La. R.S. 9:384 (effective Jan. 1, 1991)).
86. The committee expressed concern about the difficulty of a piecemeal application of the new
law to certain actions.
87. See discussion of La. Civ. Code art. 111 in H.R. 1102, Regular Sess. (1990) in supra notes
54-65 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., Lagars v. Lagars, 491 So. 2d 5 (La. 1986); Fulmer v. Fulmer, 301 So. 2d 622 (La.
1974). See discussion infra text at notes 96-106.
89. The committee intended to give preclusive effect, for alimony purposes, to a separation
judgment rendered before the effective date of the divorce law, on the grounds of the claimant's fault.
Likewise, the committee intended to provide that a separation judgment silent as to the claimant's
fault should have no preclusive effect on a claim for alimony and should not prevent the payor from
proving fault of the claimant as a means of precluding alimony after January I, 1991.
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separation pending on January 1, 1991,90 reconventional demands thereto
whenever filed (even after January 1, 1991), pending incidental actions, 9' and the
effect of a judgment of separation from bed and board.92 Another bill, part of the
Law Institute package containing the revision of the law of spousal support,
addressed in its transitional provision the effect of new prescriptive periods for
claiming spousal support.93
In an effort to make the divorce revision more palatable, the transitional
provisions extended to legally separated spouses the possibility of obtaining a
divorce six months after the date of the judicial separation. 94 To deny legally
La. R.S. 9:381 (effective Jan. 1, 1991): "This Act does not apply to ... actions for incidental
relief commenced before January 1, 1991.... Such actions are to be governed by the law in effect
prior to January 1. 1991." La. R.S. 9:382 (effective Jan. 1, 1991):
A judgment of separation from bed and board or divorce rendered before January I. 1991.
or a judgment rendered in an action governed by R.S. 9:381, shall have the same effect
that it had prior to January 1, 1991. These effects include, but are not limited to:
(2) A judicial determination of fault or freedom from fault made prior to January I,
1991, shall have the same effect on the right to claim spousal support as it had prior to
January 1, 1991.
(3) A judgment of separation or divorce rendered prior to January I, 1991, without a
determination of fault shall not preclude a subsequent adjudication of fault as a bar to
spousal support.
See discussion infra notes 96-106 and accompanying text.
90. La. R.S. 9:381 (effective Jan. 1, 1991): "This Act does not apply to actions for separation
from bed and board or divorce or actions for incidental relief commenced before January I, 1991,
or to reconventional demands thereto, whenever filed. Such actions are to be governed by the law
in effect prior to January 1, 1991."
Despite the rather obvious intention of this transitional provision, some judges and attorneys
interpreted the statute to deny to the parties the possibility of amending a petition or reconventional
demand in a pending separation suit to seek a divorce under new La. Civ. Code art. 102. Therefore.
the Legislature, by Concurrent Resolution in 1991, declared that
the sole purpose of enacting R.S. 9:381 was to permit parties to an action for separation
from bed and board filed before January I, 1991. to continue to proceed in those suits
under the law effective before that date, and was not to preclude such parties from
amending their pleadings or filing new pleadings to take advantage of the new ground for
divorce under Louisiana Civil Code Article 102.
(emphasis added).
91. Such incidental actions included requests for alimony pendente lite, alimony after divorce,
child custody, child support, injunctive relief, use and occupancy of the family home or community
movables or immovables, and use of personal property.
92. La. R.S. 9:382 (effective Jan. 1, 1991).
93. La. R.S. 9:383: "A person who is entitled to assert a claim for spousal support, and who
is adversely affected by the provisions of this Act, has one year from January I, 1989. within which
to assert a claim under the law in effect prior to that date." H.R. 1102. Regular Sess. (1990). See
also La. R.S. 9:386 in H.R. 963, Regular Sess. (1993).
94. La. R.S. 9:383 (effective Jan. I, 1991): "A. Any person who is judicially separated before
January 1, 1991, may obtain a judgment of divorce if there has been no reconciliation between the
spouses for a period of six months or more from the date the judgment of separation from bed and
board was signed."
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separated spouses this opportunity to obtain a divorce which was afforded by prior
law95 would mean a significantly longer wait for a divorce under either Louisiana
Civil Code article 102 (180 days after filing a petition) or Article 103 (one year
living separate and apart). The provision extending this possibility for divorce to
judicially separated spouses had a sunset clause of one year 96 to avoid the
undesirable situation of continuing parallel divorce law in the Civil Code
Ancillaries.
The serious effect of a fault-based judicial separation or divorce on permanent
alimony97 necessitated careful consideration of language to protect the spouse or
spouses who had relied or intended to rely98 on the determination of fault. Under
pre-1991 jurisprudence the rendition of a judgment of separation on fault
grounds" or on mutual fault'0° was determinative of whose fault caused the
separationt ' for purposes of awarding or denying permanent alimony. 2 In the
case of divorce on the basis of a spouse's fault, the other spouse was relieved of
proving his or her lack of fault"0 3 as a prerequisite to a claim for permanent
alimony.
By way of example, for couples who were judicially separated before January
1, 1991, on the grounds of fault of one spouse or mutual fault, the issue of fault for
purposes of permanent alimony was resolved. If the new divorce law eliminating
judicial separation applied, the issue of fault would have to be relitigated, since
fault remained an absolute bar to permanent periodic alimony. The committee
knew that in some cases a judicial separation on the grounds of fault was the result
of overall negotiations between the two spouses, yet in other cases separations
represented results of hotly contested trials. In either situation the two parties had
95. La. R.S. 9:302 (1898) (repealed Jan. 1, 1991).
96. La. R.S. 9:383 (1991): "B. This Section shall be effective until January 1. 1992. and
thereafter spouses who are judicially separated shall be governed by the provisions of this Act in
obtaining a judgment of divorce."
97. La. Civ. Code art. 112.
98. La. R.S. 9:381 (effective Jan. 1, 1991) directed that pre-1991 law apply to actions for
separation from bed and board and reconventional demands thereto, whenever filed. In addition La.
R.S. 9:382 (effective Jan. 1, 1991), which detailed the effect of a judgment of separation rendered
prior to the effective date of the act, extended pre-1991 law to a judgment rendered in an action
governed by La. R.S. 9:381 (separation or divorce actions filed before Jan. 1, 1991).
99. La. Civ. Code art. 138 (1870) (repealed Jan. 1, 1991) (adultery, conviction of a felony and
sentence, habitual intemperance or cruel treatment rendering the common life together insupportable,
public defamation, attempt against the life of the other, charged with a felony and fled from justice,
intentional non-support of the other who is in destitute or necessitous circumstances).
100. La. Civ. Code art. 141 (1976) (repealed Jan. 1. 1991): "A separation from bed and board
shall be granted although both spouses are mutually at fault in causing the separation. In such
instances, alimony pendente lite may be allowed but permanent alimony shall not be allowed
thereafter following divorce."
101. Fulmer v. Fulmer, 301 So. 2d 622 (La. 1974).
102. La. Civ. Code art. 112 (emphasis added): "When a spouse has not been atfiful. the
court may allow that spouse ... permanent periodic alimony .... "
103. The burden of proof shifts to the spouse found "guilty" of fault to prove the claimant's
fault. Lagars v. Lagars. 491 So. 2d 5 (La. 1986).
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expectations that the judgment of separation eliminated the necessity of trying the
fault issue for permanent alimony. Therefore, a provision of the transitional
legislation stated that "[a] judicial determination of fault or freedom from fault
made prior to January 1, 1991, shall have the same effect on the right to claim
spousal support as it had prior to January 1, 1991."'04 At the time, this provision
also reflected sensitivity to change in the law of spousal support; the Law Institute
had proposed eliminating fault as an absolute bar to permanent alimony. The
spousal support proposal retained "comparative" fault as a factor in the award of
permanent alimony' 0 5 As a result, parties who had assumed that the fault issue
was decided by virtue of a judicial separation rendered before January 1, 1991,
would have been required to litigate the general issue of entitlement to alimony
because, under the proposal, fault was only one of eleven factors to consider, not
a bar.
Likewise, a couple who had decided to pretermit the issue of fault during the
separation proceedings by obtaining a no-fault separation,'06 had expectations that
the issue of fault could be tried at a later date, if and when one of the spouses
claimed permanent alimony (with the hope that none would be claimed). The
transitional legislation provided for those couples as well, assuring that ajudgment
of separation rendered before January I, 1991, "without a determination of fault
shall not preclude a subsequent adjudication of fault as a bar to spousal sup-
port.,
107
Two of the transitional provisions concerned the status of couples who were
judicially separated on the effective date of the legislation. One provision
incorporated by general reference the pre- 1991 law of status ofjudicially separated
spouses.0 8 As a result, judicially separated couples after January 1, 1991, are
considered married,' t 9 but liberated from the obligation to live togetherli0 and
104. La. R.S. 9:382(2) (effective Jan. 1. 1991).
105. La. Civ. Code art. I 11:
The court must consider all relevant factors in determining the entitlement, amount, and
duration of final support. Those factors may include: ... (11) The comparative marital
misconduct, if any, of the parties.
The term "marital misconduct" as used in this Article means any substantial act or
omission that violates a spouse's marital duties or responsibilities.
H.R. 1102, Regular Sess. (1990).'
See also La. Civ. Code art. 112 in H.R. 963, Regular Sess. (1993). See discussion, supra notes
54-65 and accompanying text.
106. La. Civ. Code art. 138(9) (living separate and apart for six months with no reconciliation)
(repealed Jan. 1. 1991) or La. Civ. Code art. 138(10) (living six months separate and apart without
reconciliation and a joint affidavit that irreconcilable differences exist) (repealed Jan. I. 1991).
107. La. R.S. 9:382(3) (effective Jan. 1, 1991).
108. La. R.S. 9:382 (effective Jan. 1, 1991): "A judgment of separation from bed and board or
divorce rendered before January I, 1991, or a judgment rendered in an action governed by R.S.
9:381, shall have the same effect that it had prior to January I, 1991 .... "
109. La. Civ. Code an. 136 (repealed Jan. I, 1991) provided that "Isleparation from bed and
board does not dissolve the bond of matrimony, since the separated husband and wife are not at
liberty to marry again; but it puts an end to their conjugal cohabitation and to the common concerns.
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from the property-sharing arrangement of the community of acquets and gains."'
Furthermore, if a legally separated husband engages in sexual intercourse with a
person other than his wife, he is guilty of adultery and subject to a suit by his wife
for divorce." '2 A spouse who is judicially separated, however, is not considered
a surviving spouse for intestate succession purposes."'
The second provision addressed the effect of a reconciliation of judicially
separated spouses on the community of acquets and gains.' 4 What the transition-
al provisions failed to consider explicitly is the effect of reconciliation upon the
status of judicially separated spouses and upon the other incidental judgments--
such as custody and alimony pendente lite. Implicitly, the provision that addresses
the effect of reconciliation upon the community regime suggests that the effects of
the judgment of separation are terminated and the spouses' status as married
persons is restored with all the consequent legal obligations."' Pre-1991
jurisprudence is consistent. " 6 Furthermore, the use of analogy to the provision
which existed between them."
110. La. Civ. Code art. 98, see cmt. (1).
111. La. Civ. Code arts. 101, 155 (repealed Jan. I, 1991).
112. La. Civ. Code art. 103: "A divorce shall be granted on the petition ol a spouse upon proof
that: ... (2) The other spouse has committed adultery; ..
113. La. Civ. Code art. 880 (emphasis added):
In the absence of valid testamentary disposition, the undisposed property of the deceased
devolves by operation of law in favor of his descendants, ascendants, and collaterals, by
blood or by adoption, and in favor of his spouse not judicially separated from him, in the
order provided in and according to the following articles.
See also La. Civ. Code arts. 894, 895, 896. But see La. Civ. Code an. 2433 (marital portion) and
cmt. (b) to that article.
For a discussion of the effects of a separation from bed and board under the law effective before
January 1. 1991. see Robert A. Pascal & Katherine S. Spaht. Louisiana Family Law Course 261-77
(4th ed. 1986).
114. La. R.S. 9:384 (effective Jan. 1. 1991):
A. If spouses who were judicially separated ... reconcile, their community of acquets
and gains shall be reestablished between the spouses, as of the date of filing of the
original petition in the action in which the separation judgment was rendered, unless the
spouses execute prior to the reconciliation a matrimonial agreement that the community
will not be reestablished upon reconciliation. This matrimonial agreement shall not
require court approval.
B. Reestablishment of a community property regime under the provisions of this
Section shall be effective toward third persons only upon filing notice of the reestablish-
ment for registry in accordance with the provisions of Civil Code Article 2332. The
reestablishment of the community shall not prejudice the rights of.third persons validly
acquired prior to filing notice of the reestablishment nor shall it affect a prior community
property partition between the spouses.
115. La. Civ. Code arts. 98-100.
116. See, e.g., Moody v. Moody, 78 So. 2d 536 (1955); Reichen v. Lloveras, 188 La. 447. 177




that incorporates by general reference pre-1991 law as to the effect of the
separation judgment. 7 would produce the same result.
II. COMMENTARY ON NEW DIVORCE ARTICLES: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
This portion of the article will review the Civil Code and Code of Civil
Procedure articles and Revised Statutes sections enacted or amended by Acts 1990,
No. 1009, and explain the interrelationship of these provisions with each other and
with other statutory provisions. There are similarities and differences between civil
actions generally and the different types of divorce actions. For example, some of
the procedural requirements for a Civil Code article 102 divorce action are the same
or similar to those in other types of civil actions. Other procedures are unique to
this type of action. One procedure is unique to a Civil Code article 103(1) divorce
action. An understanding of the similarities and differences is critical to avoid
procedural error in divorce actions under Civil Code articles 102 and 103 and
actions incidental or related to these divorce actions.
For clarity of discussion, in some instances statutory provisions relating to the
same issue are grouped and reviewed together. The statutory provisions are
presented in a sequence which will be familiar and useful to the practitioner.
A. Goals
The implementation of the goals of the Marriage/Persons Committee is
reflected in the substantive and procedural provisions of the new divorce law.
People marry for very personal and individual reasons; the same is true of
divorce. The state cannot select a spouse for one of its citizens, nor should it try to
force a person to remain in a marriage in which a satisfactory personal relationship
is no longer possible. The state may encourage thoughtful reflection and decision
making through the procedures provided for the divorce process. Or state coercion
may be exercised by limiting the grounds or causes for which a divorce may be
obtained and requiring cumbersome and burdensome procedures in divorce actions.
In both, the underlying policy is to discourage hasty divorce. However, empirical
evidence suggests that such a public policy has not deterred divorces. Cognizant
of this, the committee included in its goals reducing adversarial proceedings,
encouraging reconciliation, and instituting simple divorce procedures in simple
cases to ensure that everyone has access to the courts in divorce cases.
The substantive and procedural rules adopted reflect these goals. They attempt
to do no more than afford the spouse who wishes to end a marriage a period for
reflection and reconsideration, and ensure that the incidental issues raised by the
impending divorce are decided by a disinterested third party.
117. La. R.S. 9:382 (effective Jan. 1. 1991). See discussion. supra notes 83-85 and accompa-
nying text.
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B. Organization
Acts 1990, No. 1009, contains provisions that are incorporated into Louisiana's
Civil Code, Code of Civil Procedure, and Revised Statutes, Titles 9 and 13. The
act follows the traditional organization of statutory provisions in Louisiana.
The Louisiana -Civil Code contains substantive provisions with respect to
persons, things, and conflicts of laws. It contains four Books: "Of Persons," "Of
Things and the Different Modifications of Ownership," "Of the Different Modes
of Acquiring the Ownership of Things," and "Of Conflict of Laws." Each book is
divided into titles, each title into chapters, some chapters into sections, and each
chapter into articles.
Title IV of Book I, entitled "Husband and Wife," contains the substantive rules
of marriage. Title V of Book I, "Divorce," contains the substantive provisions
regulating the termination of marriage by divorce and the provisional and incidental
proceedings in a divorce action. Title 9 of the Revised Statutes contains the Civil
Code Ancillaries and has the same organization as the Civil Code. Title 9 is
divided into code titles, chapters, parts, and sections. The only difference is that
each chapter in Title 9 is divided into sections not articles as in the Civil Code.
Therefore, the corresponding book and title in the Revised Statutes, Code Book 1,
Code Title V, contain the ancillary provisions concerning divorce.
The Code of Civil Procedure contains general procedural rules. It is also
organized into books, titles, chapters, sections, and articles. The procedural
provisions of Acts 1990, No. 1009, and subsequent amendatory acts are contained
in the appropriate chapters of the Code of Civil Procedure. Some apply only to
divorce and incidental actions. Just as the Civil Code has its ancillary Title 9, the
Code of Civil Procedure has its corresponding Title 13 in the Revised Statutes. In
Title 13, chapters 11 through 32 contain the general rules of civil procedure. The
provisions of Acts 1990, No. 1009, regulating service of the original petition and
notice of the rule to show cause and notice in a Louisiana Civil Code article 102
divorce action, sections 3491 and 3492, are contained in chapter 14, entitled
"Process," and the provisions of Acts 1991, No. 367, excepting divorce actions and
their incidental or related actions from the general res judicata rule, section
4232(B), are contained in chapter 23, "Judgments." As in the Code of Civil
Procedure, many of the general provisions of Title 13 are also applicable to divorce
and incidental actions, and some provisions, like those above, apply only to divorce
and incidental actions.
Many familiar provisions of the Civil Code now appear under new article
numbers. For example, Article 148, "Alimony Pendente Lite," is now Article I ll,
and Article 160, "Permanent Periodic Alimony," is now Article 112. The
Louisiana Law Institute is given statutory authority by Louisiana Revised Statutes
24:253 to redesignate article numbers. Since the prior articles regulating separation
and divorce were repealed, and the new articles regulating divorce are now Articles
102-105, the articles regulating provisional and incidental proceedings were
redesignated to be sequential with the new divorce articles.
19931
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Since passage of the divorce law revision, several acts have passed amending
the legislation and various related provisions. Two 1991 acts amended the new
divorce law."1 8 Act 918 reduced the one-year voluntary separation period to six
months for a divorce under Louisiana Civil Code article 103(1). This act was not
a Law Institute bill, but Act 367 was, and it made several changes in the divorce
law, one in claims for contributions and a significant one regarding res judicata.
C. Article 102 Divorce-The Petition
Louisiana Civil Code art. 102:
A divorce shall be granted upon motion of a spouse when either spouse
has filed a petition for divorce and upon proof that one hundred eighty
days have elapsed from the service of the petition, or from the execution
of written waiver of the service, and that the spouses have lived separate
and apart continuously since the filing of the petition.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 395 1:
A petition for divorce under Civil Code Article 102 shall contain
allegations of jurisdiction and venue and shall be verified by the affidavit
of the petitioner.
A petition filed pursuant to this article must comply with the general
requirements for pleadings'' 9 and the particular requirements for petitions. 20
118. 1991 La. Acts Nos. 367, 918.
119. La. Code Civ. P. an. 853:
Every pleading shall contain a caption setting forth the name of the court, the title and
number of the action, and a designation of the pleading. The title of the action shall state
the name of the first party on each side with an appropriate indication of other parties.
A statement in a pleading may be adopted by reference in a different part of the same
pleading or in another pleading in the same court. A copy of any written instrument
which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes.
La. Code Civ. P. art. 854:
No technical forms of pleading are required.
All allegations of fact of the petition, exceptions, or answer shall be simple, concise, and
direct, and shall be set forth in numbered paragraphs. As far as practicable, the contents
of each paragraph shall belimited to a single set of circumstances.
All pleadings are required to be in writing. La. Code Civ. P. art. 852. The pleading of specified
matters is regulated by La. Code Civ. P. arts. 855-862. La. Code Civ. P. art. 863 requires that every
pleading of a party represented by an attorney be signed by at least one attorney of record in his
individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney must
sign his pleading and state his address.
The practitioner of family law should be especially cognizant of the effect of his signature on a
pleading and the possibility of the imposition of sanctions on him and his client as a result of a
certification by signature made in violation of Article 863. The sanctions may include the payment
of reasonable attorney's fees and expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, as well as
appropriate disciplinary action for a willful violation of any provision of Article 863 or for the
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In addition, it must allege the jurisdictional facts called for by Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure article 10(A)(7),' and one or more of the bases for divorce
venue specified in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 394 1. '22 Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure article 10(A)(7) provides that a court that is otherwise
competent under the laws of Louisiana has jurisdiction of a divorce action only if
at the time of filing one or both of the spouses are domiciled in Louisiana.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3941, regulating venue, provides that an
action for an annulment of marriage or for a divorce shall be brought in a parish
where either party is domiciled, or in the parish of the last matrimonial domicile.
The article further provides that this venue may not be waived,'23 and that a
insertion of scandalous or indecent matter in a pleading. La. Code Civ. P. art. 864. See Diesel
Driving Academy, Inc. v. Ferrier, 563 So. 2d 898 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990), recalled in part, reinstated
in part on reh'g, 1990 Lexis 1902, for the obligation imposed upon an attorney who signs a pleading
to make an "objectively reasonable inquiry" into the facts and the law. Subjective good faith will
not satisfy the duty of reasonable inquiry. Id. at 902. The court also enumerates the factors to be
considered in determining whether "reasonable factual inquiry" has been made and whether
"reasonable legal inquiry" has been made. Id. at 902. For other applications of these provisions. see
Barry W. Miller v. Poirier, 580 So. 2d 558 (La. App. ist Cir. 1991): Bankston v. Alexandria
Neurosurgical Clinic, 583 So. 2d 1148 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 586 So. 2d 1066 (1991);
Fairchild v. Fairchild, 580 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991); Loyola v. A Touch of Class Transp.
Service, Inc., 580 So. 2d 506 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991).
120. La. Code Civ. P. art. 891:
The petition shall comply with Articles 853, 854, and 863. and, whenever applicable.
with Articles 855 through 861. It shall set forth the name. surname, and domicile of the
parties: shall contain a short, clear, and concise statement of all causes of action arising
out of, and of the material facts of, the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the litigation; shall designate an address, not a post office box, for receipt of service
of all items involving the litigation; and shall conclude with a prayer for judgment for the
relief sought. Relief may be prayed for in the alternative.
La. Code Civ. P. art. 892:
Except as otherwise provided in Article 3657, a petition may set forth two or more
causes of action in the alternative, even though the legal or factual bases thereof may be
inconsistent or mutually exclusive. In such cases all allegations shall be made subject to
the obligations set forth in Article 863.
121. La. Code Civ. P. art. 10(A)(7):
A. A court which is otherwise competent under the laws of this state has jurisdiction
of the following actions or proceedings only under the following conditions:
(7) An action for divorce, if, at the time of riling, one or both of the parties are
domiciled in this state.
122. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3941:
A. An action for an annulment of marriage or for a divorce shall be brought in a parish
where either party is domiciled, or in the parish of the last matrimonial domicile.
B. The venue provided in this Article may not be waived, and a judgment rendered in
either of these actions by a court of improper venue is an absolute nullity.
123. La. Code Civ. P. art. 44 provides, in part: "The venue provided in Articles... 3941 ...
may not be waived." See also La. Code Civ. P. art. 3941(B).
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judgment rendered in either of these actions by a court of improper venue is an
absolute nullity. 24
Improper venue in a divorce action has the same effect as a court's lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. A judgment rendered in either case is an absolute
nullity. 2 In neither case may the parties confer proper venue or subject matter
jurisdiction either expressly or by waiver. 2 6 However, jurisdiction and venue are
distinct legal concepts.'27 Jurisdiction is the legal power and authority of a court
to hear and determine an action or proceeding involving the legal relations of the
parties and to grant the relief to which they are entitled. 28 Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine a
particular class of actions or proceedings, based upon the object of the demand, the
amount in dispute, or the value of the right asserted."2 9 Jurisdiction over status
is a species of subject matter jurisdiction and is not subject to waiver. 30
Venue, on the other hand, refers to the parish where an action or proceeding
may properly be brought and tried.' Generally, an objection to improper venue
may be waived.1 2 In an action for a divorce, however, the venue provided in
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3941 may not be waived, either expressly
or by failure to plead the declinatory exception timely as provided in Article 928
of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, venue is the functional equivalent of
subject matter jurisdiction in a divorce action. Although this nonwaivable venue
has been referred to as "jurisdictional"' 3 or "jurisdictional venue,' 3 4 it is
conceptually incorrect to equate the legal concepts of jurisdiction and venue. To
prevent forum shopping in divorce cases, the legislature has decided that venue in
divorce actions is not subject to waiver and that a judgment of divorce by a court
of improper venue is an absolute nullity. Thus, Article 3941 simply provides
special venue rules for divorce actions; the jurisdiction of the court is not
implicated.
124. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3941(B) provides: "The venue provided in this Article may not be
waived, and a judgment rendered in either of these actions by a court of improper venue is an
absolute nullity."
125. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3, 3941(B).
126. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3, 3941(B); State Dep't Social Servs. v. Parker, 595 So. 2d 815 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1992); Douglas v. Douglas, 146 So. 2d 227 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
127. Clark v. Clark, 600 So. 2d 880, 882 (La. App. Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 604 So. 2d 1305
(1992); Sims v. Sims, 388 So. 2d 428, 430 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
128. La. Code Civ. P. art. I.
129. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2.
130. Dailey v. Hough, 368 So. 2d 1182 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 So. 2d 1378 (1979):
Douglas v. Douglas, 146 So. 2d 227, 230 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962); Jones v. Shadwick, 601 So. 2d
371, 374 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992). See also Lucas v. Lucas, 195 So. 2d 771, 776 (La. App. 3d Cir.)
(Culpepper, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 250 La. 539, 197 So. 2d 81 (1967).
131. La. Code Civ. P. art. 41.
132. La. Code Civ. P. art. 44.
133. Notes to La. Code Civ. P. art. 3941.
134. Paschall v. Paschall, 357 So. 2d 1266. 1267 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
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The petition states that the plaintiff desires to be divorced from the defendant.
It must be verified by the affidavit of the petitioner.' Verification by
petitioner's attorney is not sufficient.
3 6
D. Incidental Relief-Use of Summary Proceedings
Louisiana Civil Code article 105:
In a proceeding for divorce or thereafter, either spouse may request
a determination of custody, visitation or support of a minor child; support
for a spouse; injunctive relief; use and occupancy of the family home or
use of community movables or immovables; or use of personal property.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 425:
A. A party shall assert all causes of action arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation.
B. Paragraph A of this Article shall not apply to an action for divorce
under Civil Code Article 102 or 103, an action for determination of
incidental matters under Civil Code Article 105, an action for contribu-
tions to a spouse's education or training under Civil Code Article 121, and
an action for partition of community property and settlement of claims
between spouses under R.S. 9:2801.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4232(B):
B. In an action for divorce under Civil Code Article 102 or 103, in
an action for determination of incidental matters under Civil Code Article
105, in an action for contributions to a spouse's education or training
under Civil Code Article 121, and in an action for partition of community
property and settlement of claims between spouses under R. S. 9:2801, the
judgment has the effect of res judicata only as to causes of action actually
adjudicated.
The petition for divorce may request a determination of the above-listed
incidental matters and those matters may be disposed of, at trial or otherwise, by
summary proceedings.' 37 If not asserted in the petition for a divorce, a determi-
135. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3951. For suggested forms for this petition and other pleadings in
divorce actions, see La. Code Civ. P. Forms 370(1)-370(23) (Supp. 1993).
136. La. Civ. Code art. 102. This is one of the exceptions provided by law to the La. Code Civ.
P. art. 863 provision that pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit or certificate.
137. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2592 provides, in part:
Summary proceedings may be used for trial or disposition of the following matters only:
(1) An incidental question arising in the course of judicial proceedings, including the
award of and the determination of reasonableness of attorney's fees.
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nation of these incidental matters may be sought in subsequent pleadings, by
ordinary or summary proceedings, as is appropriate to a particular action.' 38
1. Use of Summary Proceedings
Louisiana Code Civil Procedure article 2592:
Summary proceedings may be used for trial or disposition of the
following matters only:
(1) An incidental question arising in the course of judicial proceed-
ings, including the determination of reasonableness of attorney's fees.
(3) An issue which may be raised properly by an exception,
contradictory motion, or rule to show cause.
(8) The original granting of, subsequent change in, or termination of
custody, visitation and support for a minor child; support for a spouse;
injunctive relief; support between ascendants and descendants; use and
occupancy of the family home or use of community movables or
immovables; or use of personal property.
(11) All other matters in which the law permits summary proceed-
ings to be used.
(8) The original granting of, subsequent change in, or termination of custody, visitation,
and support for a minor child; support for a spouse; injunctive relief; support between
ascendants and descendants; use and occupancy of the family home or use of community
movables or immovables; or use of personal property.
(11) All other matters in which the law permits summary proceedings to be used.
138. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2592, cmt.:
Paragraph (8) relief may be sought as an incident to a termination of marriage action or
after a judgment has been granted in such an action. The phrase "injunctive relief'
applies to family-related injunctions under Code Title V of Title 9 of the Revised Statutes.
See also La. Code Civ. P. art. 425, cmt.:
Paragraph B is added to this Article in order to make it clear that a party to a divorce
action is not required to raise the actions commonly associated with divorce actions, such
as claims for spousal and child support, in the divorce action itself. Such claims
historically have been assertable after the divorce action has been concluded by judgment,
and the added phrase makes it clear that this Article does not change the law in that
respect.
See also La. R. S. 13:4232 (Supp. 1993), cmt.:
Subsection B is added to this Section to make it clear that failure to raise related causes
of action in any of the specified actions will not result in the actions that were not urged
being barred by the subsequent judgment, if that judgment is silent as to the actions in
question.
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Summary proceedings are those conducted with rapidity, within the delays
allowed by the court, and without citation and the observance of all the formalities
required in evidentiary proceedings."' A summary proceeding may be com-
menced by the filing of a contradictory motion or by a rule to show cause, except
as otherwise provided by law."4 If the order applied for by written motion is one
to which. the mover is clearly entitled without supporting proof, the court may grant
the order ex parte and without hearing the adverse party.' Examples are a
temporary restraining order prohibiting a spouse from disposing of or encumbering
community property 4 2 or harming, harassing, or physically or sexually abusing
the other spouse or a child of either of the parties.'43 Some orders may not be
issued ex parte but require a contradictory hearing. 44 An example is the award-
ing of the use and occupancy of the family residence and use of community
movables and immovables pending partition of the community property. 43 The
rule to show cause is a contradictory motion. 46
An obligation for attorney's fees and costs in an action for divorce incurred
before the date of the judgment of divorce that terminates the community regime
is now a community obligation of that regime, subject to the same rules as to
enforcement, allocation, and reimbursement as other community obligations."'
139. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2591.
140. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2593.
141. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 963, 3603. Article 963 provides:
If the order applied for by written notice is one to which mover is clearly entitled
without supporting proof, the court may grant the order ex parte and without hearing the
adverse party.
If the order applied for by written notice is one to which the mover is not clearly
entitled, or which requires supporting proof, the motion shall be served on and tried
contradictorily with the adverse party.
The rule to show cause is a contradictory motion.
142. La. R.S. 9:371 (1991).
143. La. R.S. 9:372 (1991).
144. La. Code Civ. P. art. 963.
145. La. R.S. 9:374 (1991).
146. La. Code Civ. P. art. 963.
147. 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 3 (effective Jan. 1, 1991), adding La. Civ. Code art. 2362.1 and
amending La. Civ. Code art. 2363. See Comment-1990 to La. Civ. Code art. 2363. Art. 2362.1
provides: "An obligation for attorney's fees and costs in an action for divorce incurred before the
date of the judgment of divorce that terminates the community property regime is a community
obligation of that regime."
Article 2363, in part, classifies as a separate obligation "an obligation incurred after termination
of a community property regime, except an obligation incurred for attorney's fees and costs under
Article 2362.1."
Read literally, Article 2362.1 classifies as a community obligation only those attorney's fees and
costs "incurred before the date of the judgment of divorce that terminates the community property
regime," (emphasis added) and Article 2363 classifies as a separate obligation those attorney's fees
and costs incurred on or after the date of the judgment of divorce. This result was not intended.
Attorney's fees incurred through the obtaining of the divorce should be classified as a community
obligation. See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
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Previously, the action to obtain a judgment for attorney's fees was an ordinary
proceeding. '48 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2592 has been amended
to include it as an incidental question arising in the course of judicial proceedings,
for which summary proceedings may be used. 4 9 Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 2592 was also amended to expressly permit the use of summary
proceedings for the granting of the use and occupancy of the family home, use of
community movables and immovables, and use of personal property.'5 0 Courts
may grant ex parte orders for spouses to obtain designated personal property.''
Louisiana Civil Code article 102 provides that a divorce shall be granted upon
motion of a spouse when the requirements of that article are mel. Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure article 3952 sets forth the required allegations in the rule to show
cause provided under Louisiana Civil Code article 102. Subsequent articles also
refer to the rule to show cause why a divorce should not be granted. Originally, the
second paragraph of Louisiana Civil Code article 102 provided that the motion for
divorce shall be a "rule to show cause."' 52 The second paragraph was inadver-
Because of the Louisiana Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law in
Louisiana, the reasonableness of attorney's fees is subject to judicial scrutiny. Baton Rouge v.
Stauffer Chemical Co., 500 So. 2d 397 (La. 1987); Leenerts Farms, Inc.,v. Rogers, 421 So. 2d 216
(La. 1982); Scott v. Kemper Ins. Co., 377 So. 2d 66 (La. 1979); Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Products.
Inc., 373 So. 2d 102 (La. 1978). Although now classified as a community obligation, attorney's fees
asserted as a community obligation will still be. subject to the pre-amendment jurisprudential
reasonableness test. See Gallagher v. Gallagher, 190 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966). Attorney's
fees are the only community obligation in which the reasonableness of the amount of the obligation
is subject to judicial scrutiny.
148. Prior to its amendment, La. Code Civ. P. art. 2592 did not list an action for attorney's fees
as one of the matters for which summary proceedings may be used. The statutory listing in Article
2592 of actions that may be instituted by summary process has been generally held to be exclusive.
See Clay v. Clay, 389 So. 2d 31 (La. 1979); State, Dep't of Highways v. Lamar Advertising Co., 279
So. 2d 671 (La. 1973); Burdine & Assocs., Inc. v. Noel, 550 So. 2d 677 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989);
Irvin v. Irvin, 425 So. 2d 936 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
149. 1989 La. Acts No. 118, § 1.
150. 1990 La. Acts Nos. 1008, 1009, § 4, both effective Jan I, 1991, made identical changes in
subparagraph (8) to provide for these incidental actions to be instituted by summary proceedings.
151. La. R.S. 9:373 (1991) provides:
A. In a proceeding for divorce, a court may grant an ex pane order requiring the sheriff
or appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany a spouse to the family residence or
another location designated by the court so that personal property specified in the order
may be obtained by that spouse.
B. Personal property which may be obtained by a court order issued under this Section
includes, but is not limited to, the following:
(1) Items of personal wearing apparel belonging to the petitioning spouse or
belonging to any children in the custody of the spouse.
(2) Food and eating utensils necessary for the spouse or any children in the custody
of the spouse.
(3) Any other item or items deemed necessary by the court for the safety or well-
being of the spouse or any children in the custody of the spouse.
152. 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 2 (effective Jan I, 1991). The second paragraph provided that
"[tihe motion shall be a rule to show cause filed after the one hundred eighty days have elapsed."
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tently omitted from Article 102 when it was amended and re-enacted by Acts 199 1,
No. 367, to add the provision for written waiver of service.'-" This omission was
cured by legislation restoring the second paragraph to Article 102 in 1993. '
However, the use of the word "motion" in Louisiana Civil Code article 102 was
consistent with the use of the phrase "rule to show cause" in Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure article 3952 since both refer to contradictory motions. The articles
of the Code of Civil Procedure simply specify which type of motion must be used
in obtaining the divorce.
E. Service of Petition and Notice of Suit
Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3491:
A. A notice in a divorce action under Civil Code Article 102 must be
signed by the clerk of the court or his deputy issuing it with an expression
of his official capacity and under the seal of his office; must be accompa-
nied by a certified copy of the petition, exclusive of exhibits, even if made
a part thereof; and must contain the following:
(1) The date of issuance;
(2) The title of the cause;
(3) The name of the person to whom it is addressed;
(4) The title and location of the court issuing it; and
(5) Statements to the following effect:
(a) The person served is being sued for divorce by
his spouse under Civil Code Article 102, and that one
hundred and eighty days after the service occurs the
suing spouse is entitled to file a motion for final di-
vorce;
(b) The suing spouse will no longer be able to
move for a final divorce after one year has elapsed
from the date of the service;
(c) The person served is entitled to file his or her
own motion for a final divorce against the suing
spouse; and
(d) The person served is entitled to file motions
for incidental relief in the divorce proceeding, including
motions for spousal support, child custody, and child
support.
B. The statements required to appear in the notice shall provide
substantially as follows:
153. See Editor's Note to La. Civ. Code art. 102 (A. N. Yiannopolos ed., West 1992).




YOU ARE BEING SUED FOR DIVORCE BY YOUR SPOUSE.
ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY DAYS AFTER YOU RECEIVE THIS
NOTICE YOUR SPOUSE MAY FILE FOR AND OBTAIN A FINAL
DIVORCE.
YOU MAY FILE FOR A FINAL DIVORCE YOURSELF, AND
YOU MAY SEEK CUSTODY OF CHILDREN, AND MONEY FOR
THEIR SUPPORT AND YOUR SUPPORT, AS WELL AS OTHER
RELIEF TO PROTECT YOU.
IF YOUR SPOUSE FAILS TO FILE FOR A FINAL DIVORCE IN
ONE YEAR, HE MAY NOT DO SO WITHOUT FILING NEW PAPERS
AND WAITING ANOTHER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY DAYS.
IF YOU ARE UNSURE OF WHAT TO DO AS A RESULT OF
THIS NOTICE, YOU SHOULD TALK IMMEDIATELY WITH AN
ATTORNEY ABOUT IT.
A certified copy of the petition must be served on the defendant 55 unless the
defendant executes and files a written waiver of service of the petition. 56 The
written waiver must be executed after the filing of the petition and be made a part
of the record.'57
No citation is required in the action for the divorce.'58 In all cases procedural
due process requires that a defendant be notified in some reasonable manner that
an action has been instituted against him and of the nature of that action in order
that he may have a fair opportunity to defend himself.'59 Procedural due process
does not require any particular form of notice."6 The required notice may take
155. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1202, governing ordinary actions generally, provides that the citation
"must be accompanied by a certified copy of the petition, exclusive of exhibits, even it made a part
thereof .... " Although citation is not required and would be inappropriate in an action for a divorce
pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 102, the general requirement of service of a certified copy of the
petition is retained. La. R.S. 13:3491(A) (1991) provides that the required notice in a divorce action
under La. Civ. Code art. 102 "must be accompanied by a certified copy of the petition, exclusive of
exhibits, even if made a part thereof."
156. A discussion of the requirements for a valid waiver of service in an action for a La. Civ.
Code art. 102 divorce is contained at infra notes 203-207.
157. La. Civ. Code art. 102; La. Code Civ. P. art. 3957(C).
158. In an action for divorce under La. Civ. Code art. 102, La. R.S. 13:3491 (1991) requires
service upon the defendant of the statutory notice in the required form, together with a certified copy
of the petition for divorce.
159. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. 1, § 2; Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct. 652, 657 (1950); Wilson v. City of New Orleans. 479 So. 2d 891
(La. 1985); State v. Woodard, 387 So. 2d 1066, 1068 (La. 1980); Grimmer v. Beaud, 537 So. 2d 299
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 538 So. 2d 613 (1989); Klein v. Klein, 487 So. 2d 775, 776
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1986); McLaughlin v. Jefferson Parish School Board, 560 So. 2d 585. 588-89 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1990).
160. Wilson, 479 So. 2d 891; White v. Board of Supervisors, 365 So. 2d 583, 585 (La. App. Ist
Cir. 1978).
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several forms in a suit that cumulates actions for a divorce, for determination of
incidental matters, for a partition of community property and settlement of the
claims of the parties, and a claim for contributions to education or training.' 6' An
action is an instituted cause of action, i.e., a demand for the enforcement of a legal
right. 62 An action is instituted to enforce a cause of action and a remedy. 163
In a typical divorce suit, there may be cumulated actions" 6 for divorce, 61
custody,' 66 visitation,167 child support, 6 alimony pendente lite, 169 perma-
nent periodic or lump sum alimony, 70 use and occupancy of the family residence
and community movables or immovables, 7' injunctive relief, 72 partition of
161. Cumulation of actions is the joinder of separate actions in the same judicial demand.
whether by a single plaintiff against a single defendant, or by one or more plaintiffs against one or
more defendants. La. Code Civ. P. art. 461.
La. Code Civ. P. art. 462 permits the cumulation of two or more actions by a plaintiff against the
same defendant, subject to the following limitations:
(1) Each of the actions cumulated is within the jurisdiction of the court and is brought
in the proper venue; and
(2) All of the actions cumulated are mutually consistent and employ the same form of
procedure.
Except as otherwise provided in La. Code Civ. P. art. 3657, inconsistent or mutually
exclusive actions may be cumulated in the same judicial demand if pleaded in the
alternative.
Washington v. Washington, 493 So. 2d 1227 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986) permitted the cumulation of
an action for partition of community property and settlement of the claims of the parties under La.
R.S. 9:2801 (Supp. 1993), an ordinary proceeding, and a motion for possession of the family home
and household goods under La. R.S. 9:374 (1991), a summary proceeding. The court held that the
two proceedings were not inconsistent because summary proceedings may be used to try traverses
in La. R.S. 9:2801 (Supp. 1993) and that to this extent, both procedures can be used in both actions.
La. Civ. Code art. 105 and La. Code Civ. P. art. 2592(8) expressly authorize the cumulation of the
ordinary action for divorce and the use of summary proceedings for the determination of the listed
incidental matters.
162. La. Code Civ. P. art. 421:
A civil action is a demand for the enforcement of a legal right. It is commenced by the
filing of a pleading presenting the demand to a court of competent jurisdiction. Amicable
demand is not a condition precedent to a civil action, unless specifically required by law.
See also Official Revision Comments to Article 421.
163. For discussions of actions and the distinction between actions and suits, see Harris v.
Bardwell, 373 So. 2d 777, 781-82 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979); Sims v. Sims, 247 So. 2d 602, 604-05
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1971); Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Gagnard, 223 So. 2d 233, 237 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1969); Martin Exploration Co. v. Joli Services, Inc., 360 So. 2d 902 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
164. La. Civ. Code art. 105; La. Code Civ. P. arts. 461, 462.
165. La. Civ. Code arts. 102, 103.
166. La. Civ. Code arts. 131, 134.
167. La. Civ. Code arts. 132, 133.
168. La. Civ. Code arts. 131(A)(l)(c), 227; La. R.S. 9:315-315.15 (1991 and Supp. 1993).
169. La. Civ. Code art. I l1.
170. La. Civ. Code art. 112.
171. La. R.S. 9:374 (1991).
172. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3601, 3944; La. R.S. 9:371, 372 (1991).
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community property and settlement of the claims of the spouse, 7 ' contributions
to the education and training of a spouse, 174 attorney's fees,175 and removal of
personal property. 176
Some of these actions must be instituted by ordinary proceedings, and some
may be instituted by either ordinary or summary proceedings.' 77 In ordinary
proceedings citation and service of citation constitute the requisite procedural due
process notice. 7 8  A citation requires the person upon whom it is served to
comply with the demand contained in the petition or make an appearance, either by
173. La. R.S. 9:2801, 2802 (1991 and Supp. 1993).
174. La. Civ. Code arts. 121-124.
175. La. Civ. Code art. 2362.1.
176. La. R.S. 9:373 (1991).
177. Summary proceedings are authorized by La. Code Civ. P. art. 2592(8) for the determination
of custody, visitation, and support of a minor child; support for a spouse; injunctive relief; support
between ascendants and descendants; use and occupancy of the family home and use of community
movables or immovables; and use of personal property. Actions for divorce tinder La. Civ. Code art.
103 must be instituted by ordinary proceedings. La. Code Civ. P. art. 851. An action for a divorce
under La. Civ. Code art. 102 must also be instituted by ordinary proceedings; however, the
application for the divorce filed after the 180-day delay must be by summary proceedings. La. Civ.
Code art. 102; La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3952, 3956. A claim for contributions to the education and
training of a spouse and an action for partition of community property and for the settlement of the
claims of the parties must be by ordinary proceedings. La. Code Civ. P. art. 851. However.
summary proceedings may be used in an action for partition of community property and the
settlement of the claims of the parties for the setting of time limits for the filing of detailed
descriptive lists and traverses of or concurrence in detailed descriptive lists and for the trial of the
traverses. La. R.S. 9:2801(1) and (2) (Supp. 1993).
There is no specific authorization for use of summary proceedings for awarding, at the time of the
divorce, attorney's fees and costs incurred before the date of the judgment of divorce that terminates
the community property regime. However, La. Code Civ. P. art. 2592(1) authorizes the use of
summary proceedings for the trial and disposition of an incidental question arising in the course of
judicial proceedings, including the determination of reasonableness of attorney's fees. This provision
should include the awarding of attorney's fees in divorce actions pursuant to La. Civ. Code arts. 2357
and 2362.1.
La. Civ. Code arts. 2357 and 2362.1 appear to exclude as community obligations the attorney's
fees and costs incurred on the day the divorce judgment is rendered, including attorney's lees and
costs for the court appearance to obtain the divorce judgment. Formerly, La. Civ. Code art. 159
classified as a liability of the community "attomey fees and costs incurred by a spouse in the action
in which the judgment (of divorce) is rendered," which included the attorney's fees and costs incurred
at the hearing at which the diorce decree was rendered. There was no intention to eliminate those
attorney's fees and costs in La. Civ. Code art. 2362.1. See Revision Comments-1990 to La. Civ.
Code art. 159. See supra note 147 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion of
attorney's fees.
178. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 6, 1201, 1231. See Duehring v. Vasquez, 490 So. 2d 667 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1986).
La. Code Civ. P. art. 1201 provides:
A. Citation and service thereof are essential in all civil actions except summary and
executory proceedings and divorce actions under Article 102 of the Civil Code. Without
them all proceedings are absolutely null.
B. The defendant may expressly waive citation and service thereof by any written
waiver made part of the record.
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filing a pleading or otherwise, within a stipulated delay under penalty of de-
fault.179 In summary proceedings service of the contradictory motion or the rule
to show cause and order assigning date and hour of trial is the requisite notice to the
defendant.8 0 Citation and service of citation are not necessary.'"' In executory
proceedings citation and service of citation are also not necessary; 82 service of
the demand for payment' and of the notice of seizure'84 fulfill the notice
function.'85 Citation is not required in a Louisiana Civil Code article 102 action
because the defendant is not required to respond in any way to the petition. In a
Louisiana Civil Code article 102 divorce action, service of the certified copy of the
petition for divorce and the notice of suit functions as notice."' When actions for
179. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1202:
The citation must be signed by the clerk of the court issuing it with an expression of his
official capacity and under the seal of his office; must be accompanied by a certified copy
of the petition, exclusive of exhibits, even if made a part thereof; and must contain the
following:
(1) The date of issuance;
(2) The title of the cause;
(3) The name of the person to whom it is addressed:
(4) The title and location of the court issuing it; and
(5) A statement that the person cited must either comply with the demand
contained in the petition or make an appearance, either by filing a pleading or
otherwise, in the court issuing the citation within the delay provided in Article 1001
under penalty of default.
180. Klein v. Klein, 487 So. 2d 775, 776 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986), La. Code Civ. P. art. 2594.
cmts.
181. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2594.
182. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2640.
183. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2639. Service of the demand for payment may be waived by the
debtor in the act of mortgage or privilege or in the debtor's security agreement. In this event the
demand for payment need not be served on the defendant. Reed v. Meaux, 292 So. 2d 557, 574 (La.
1974). La. Code Civ. P. arts. 2638 and 2639 have been held to be constitutional. Buckner v.
Carmack, 272 So. 2d 326 (La. 1973), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 901, 94 S. Ct. 2594 (1974).
However, unless service of the demand for payment is waived, a defendant in an executory
proceeding has an absolute and unqualified right to be served with the notice of demand for payment
prior to the sale of the property, and the failure to serve a notice of demand to pay, in the absence
of a waiver of it, is a defect which strikes the judicial sale with nullity. Bourgeois v. De Soto, 280
So. 2d 271 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972), writ denied, 282 So. 2d 141 (La. 1973); Consolidation Loans,
Inc. v. Guercio, 200 So. 2d 717, 721 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1966).
184. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2721. Unlike a demand for payment, service of a written notice of
seizure may not be validly waived in the act of mortgage or privilege or in the debtor's security
agreement. Security Homestead Ass'n v. Fuselier, 591 So. 2d 335, 340 (La. 1991). If the debtor
could validly waive both the demand for payment and the notice of seizure. he would receive no
notice at all of the institution of the executory proceedings or seizure of his property. For these and
other reasons, paragraph B of Article 2721 prohibits a waiver of the sheriff's notice of seizure. See
Official Revision Comment (b) to Article 2721.
185. See Neff v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 347 So. 2d 1228 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1977); Brown v.
Everding, 357 So. 2d 1243, 1248 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
186. La. Civ. Code art. 102; La. Code Civ. P. art. 1201; La. R.S. 13:3491 (1991).
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incidental relief are cumulated with the action for divorce, '8 summary process
may be used in the actions for incidental relief,'88 and service of the contradictory
motion or rule to show cause and order assigning date and hour of trial serves as the
requisite notice in these incidental actions.8 9 If an action for the partition of
community property and settlement of the claims of the parties"9 and a claim for
contributions to education or training of the other spouse,' 9' both ordinary
actions, are cumulated with the divorce action,' 92 citation and service of citation
are required for those cumulated ordinary actions.'
9 3
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1201, which provides that citation
and service thereof are required in all civil actions except summary and executory
proceedings, was amended by Acts 1991, No. 367, to additionally exclude from this
citation requirement divorce actions under Louisiana Civil Code article 102 of the
Civil Code. Although Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3491 sets forth the notice
requirements for a Louisiana Civil Code article 102 action, Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 1201 was amended to address some concerns as to whether
citation and service thereof were also required.
Additionally, a notice signed by the clerk of court or his deputy issuing it, with
an expression of his official capacity and under his seal of office, containing the
statements required by Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3491,'99 must be served on
187. La. Civ. Code art. 105.
188. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2592(8).
189. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 2593, 2594.
190. La. R.S. 9:2801 (Supp. 1993).
191. La. Civ. Code arts. 121-124.
192. La. Code Civ. P. art. 462.
193. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1201.
194. See supra text at Part 11, Section E. An error appears in La. R.S. 13:3491(A)(5)(b) (1991).
As originally recommended by the Louisiana State Law Institute, La. Code of Civ. P. art. 3954
provided that a divorce action instituted under La. Civ. Code art. 102 is abandoned if the rule to
show cause provided by that article is not filed within one year of the service of the original petition.
See Comment-1990. In 1991, the Law Institute recommended the addition of the words "or
execution of written waiver of service of the original petition" to coordinate this provision with new
Article 3957 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which expressly authorizes the waiver of service of the
original petition and the rule to show cause and accompanying notices. The legislature. in 1991 La.
Acts No. 367, § 2, also amended the article to substitute "two years" for "one year" following the
words "is not filed within." However, the notice of suit provision, La. R.S. 13:3491 (A)(5)(b) ( 1991 ),
was not similarly amended by the legislature. Also, Comment-l1991 to La. Code Civ. P. an. 3954
and Comment-1991 to La. Civ. Code art. 102 do not note this change, as the legislative change was
not upon the recommendation of the Law Institute. For a discussion of this amendment, see infra
note 265 and accompanying text.
Additionally, the La. R.S. 13:3491 (1991) and 3492 (1991) texts and notice forms do not reflect
the provisions of La. Code Civ. P. art. 3957 permitting an express waiver of the service of the initial
petition for divorce, the rule to show cause why a divorce should not be granted, and the
accompanying notices. The articles refer to service of the initial petition for divorce and the rule to
show cause, La. R.S. 13:3491(A)(5)(a) (1991) and 3492(A)(6)(b) (1991), respectively. The notices.
however, refer to a party having received the notice of the divorce action. Presumably, when a
waiver of service of the initial petition and notice is executed, that party will contentporaneoLIsIy
[Vol. 54
LOUISIANA'S NEW DIVORCE LEGISLATION
the defendant1 95 unless a written waiver of service of the notice is executed by the
defendant after the filing of the petition and it is made a part of the record.' 96
The notice of suit requirements of Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3491,
excluding the requirement that a certified copy of the petition be served with the
notice, are only directory. 97 Although both a certified copy of the initial petition
for divorce and the Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3491 notice are required to be
served on the defendant spouse in a Louisiana Civil Code article 102 divorce
action,' 98 proof of service of the Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3491 notice is not
required to obtain a divorce. 99 The mandatory 180-day waiting period com-
mences with the service of the initial petition (or waiver thereof), not with service
of the notice (or waiver thereof).2
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3953 governing the nullity of a
divorce judgment and Article 3954 governing abandonment of a divorce action
refer only to the service or waiver of service of the initial petition, not the notice.
The notice for purposes of divorce, patterned after the notice given defendants
in actions instituted in small claims courts,2"' is informational and ensures that
the defendant spouse in an Article 102 divorce action is notified, in simple terms,
that he or she is being sued for a divorce, advises the spouse of his or her right to
seek certain relief, and contains certain procedural time limits and other informa-
tion.
Failure to issue or serve the notice does not affect the validity of a divorce
obtained in the action."' On the other hand, failure to serve a certified copy of
the divorce petition, unless service is waived, renders the divorce judgment an
absolute nullity, since such service represents the required procedural due process
notice to the defendant. 20
3
receive a copy of the initial petition and notice, minimizing the possibility of misunderstanding on
the part of the defendant in the action for divorce.
195. La. R.S. 13:3491 (1991).
196. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3957.
197. See Revision Comments-1987 to La. Civ. Code art. 91 and the cases cited for the effect
of failure to comply with a directory requirement.
198. La. R.S. 9:3491 (1991).
199. See La. Code Civ.P. art. 3956.
200. La. Civ. Code art. 102; La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3952, 3953; La. R.S. 9:3491, 3492 (1991).
201. La. R.S. 13:5204 (1991). However, there is a substantial difference in the effect of the
failure to serve the statutory notice in the small claims division of city courts and in actions for La.
Civ. Code art. 102 divorces. Under La. R.S. 13:5204 (1991), the notice must be contained in a
citation or other process. If a citation containing the mandatory notice is not validly served on a
defendant in an action in the small claims division of a city court, a resulting judgment is an absolute
nullity. Guillory v. Guillory, 396 So. 2d 540 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981). Failure to serve the notice
in a divorce action does not result in the nullity of the divorce judgment. See La. Code Civ. P. art.
3953.
202. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3953. This result is implicit in the article's inclusion of service of
the petition and omission of service of the notice.
203. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3952-3953, 3956(2).
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F. Waiver of Service
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1201:
A. Citation and service thereof are essential in all civil actions except
summary and executory proceedings and divorce actions under Article
102 of the Civil Code. Without them all proceedings are absolutely null.
B. The defendant may expressly waive citation and service thereof
by any written waiver made part of the record.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3957:
A. A party in a divorce action under Civil Code Article 102 may
expressly waive service of the petition and accompanying notice by any
written waiver executed after the filing of the petition and made part of the
record.
B. If there is such a waiver, the periods specified by Civil Code
Article 102 and Code of Civil Procedure Articles 3953 and 3954 shall run
from the date of execution of the waiver.
C. A party in a divorce action under Civil Code Article 102 may
expressly waive service of the rule to show cause why a divorce should
not be granted and accompanying notice by any written waiver executed
after the filing of the rule to show cause and made part of the record.
Article 3957 was added by Acts 1991, No. 367, because of concerns about
whether service of the original petition for divorce and its accompanying notice and
the rule to show cause and its accompanying notice in an Article 102 divorce action
could be waived. None of the original Civil Code or Code of Civil Procedure
articles regulating this action for divorce prohibited such a waiver of service.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3957 now expressly provides for such
waivers. Additionally, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1201 was
amended in the same act to except Article 102 divorce actions from its citation and
service requirements.
The waiver of service of the initial petition for an Article 102 divorce and its
accompanying notice must be in writing and must be executed after the filing of the
petition. The written waiver must be made a part of the record. Also, the waiver
of service of the rule to show cause why a divorce should not be granted and
accompanying notice must be executed after the filing of the rule to show cause.
This written waiver must also be made a part of the record. The requirements that
the waiver of service be written and be made a part of the record are consistent with
and parallel'to the requirements of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 120 1,
permitting the waiver of citation and service.
[Vol. 54
LOUISIANA 'S NEW DIVORCE LEGISLATION
If service of the initial petition and accompanying notice is waived, the 180-
day waiting period commences' from the date of execution of the waiver, not
from the date of the filing of the written waiver in the record. The committee
deliberately chose this event to avoid the type of problem resulting from the long
arm statute's provision that the thirty-day delay for the rendition of a default
judgment commences when the required proof of service of process in affidavit
form is filed in the record, not when the affidavit of service of process is execut-
ed.205 Therefore, the inadvertent failure to file the written waiver in the record
will not preclude the commencement of the mandatory 180-day waiting period.
Normally, compliance with the requirement that the waiver be executed after
the filing of the petition for divorce and motion for divorce, respectively, is
determined by the date inserted in the waiver. What is the effect of a failure to date
the waiver? Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3471(4) requires that an acceptance of
service shall be dated and provides that if no date is shown thereon, the acceptance
takes effect from the date of its filing in court.' 6 The 180 days is a mandatory
waiting period that may not be waived in any manner, and non-compliance with it
results in the absolute nullity of the judgment of divorce.2 0'7 If a waiver of the
initial petition for divorce is undated, it should be considered as having been dated
upon its being made a part of the record, and the mandatory 180-day waiting period
commences on that date. The 180-day waiting period is not simply a procedural
requirement; it and the other requirements of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
article 3953 represent matters of public policy. 28 Nor should a general appear-
ance be permitted to substitute for the service and waiver requirements of Louisiana
Civil Code article 102 and Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3952 because
of their public policy underpinnings.
G. Motion for Divorce (Rule to Show Cause)
Louisiana Civil Code article 102:
A divorce shall be granted upon motion of a spouse when either
spouse has filed a petition for divorce and upon proof that one hundred
eighty days have elapsed from the service of the petition, or from the
204. La. Civ. Code art. 102; La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3952-3953.
205. La. R.S. 13:3205 (1991); Glessner v. Hyatt, 380 So. 2d 222 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
206. La. R.S. 13:3471(4) (1991): "An acceptance of service shall be dated, and if no date is
shown thereon, the acceptance takes effect from the date of its filing in court. No acceptance of
service shall affect the delays allowed by law or by the local rules of court."
207. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3953.
208. La. Civ. Code art. 11, prior to its repeal and replacement by La. Civ. Code art. 7, 1987 La.
Acts No. 124 (effective Jan. 1, 1988), referred to "public order." The jurisprudence frequently
referred to "public policy." Present La. Civ. Code art. 7 refers to "the public interest." The terms
generally mean the same thing. The 180-day waiting period reflects Louisiana's historical prohibition
of "quickie" divorces as a matter of public policy, except for limited serious reasons now reflected
in La. Civ. Code art. 103(2) and (3), the commission of adultery and the commission of a felony and
resulting sentence of death or imprisonment at hard labor.
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execution of written waiver of the service, and that the spouses have lived
separate and apart continuously since the filing of the petition.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3952:
The rule to show cause provided under Civil Code Article 102 shall
allege proper service of the initial petition for divorce, that one hundred
eighty days or more have elapsed since that service, and that the spouses
have lived separate and apart continuously since the filing of the original
petition. The rule to show cause shall be verified by the affidavit of the
mover.
When 180 days have elapsed since the service of the initial petition for a
divorce, or since the execution of the written waiver of service, either spouse may
file a motion for a divorce.'09 The motion is a rule to show cause why a divorce
decree should not be rendered.1 ° Motions may be granted ex parte or may
require service on and a contradictory trial with the adverse party.2"' In addition
to the other requirements regulating the form and contents of motions,' -" the rule
209. La. Civ. Code art. 102; La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3952, 3957.
210. La. Civ. Code art. 102; La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3952, 3956(3).
When originally enacted by 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, Louisiana Civil Code article 102 contained
a second paragraph providing that "[tlhe motion shall be a rule to show cause filed after one hundred
eighty days have elapsed."
When Article 102 was amended by 1991 Acts No. 367 to add the provision for written waiver of
service of the initial petition for divorce, the second paragraph was inadvertently omitted. The
omission did not change the Article 102 divorce procedure, however, as the "rule to show cause"
language is still retained in La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3952, 3953, 3954, 3956, and 3957(C). The omitted
language simply stated the type of contradictory motion to be used. The language inadvertently
omitted was restored by 1993 La. Acts No. 107.
211. La. Code Civ. P. art. 963.
212. La. Code Civ. P. art. 962 provides:
A written motion shall comply with Articles 853 and 863, and shall state the grounds
therefor, and the relief or order sought. It must also comply with Article 854 if the
motion is lengthy, and whenever applicable, with Articles 855 through 861.
La. Code Civ. P. art. 853 provides:
Every pleading shall contain a caption setting forth the name of the court, the title and
number of the action, and a designation of the pleading. The title of the action shall state
the name of the first party on each side with an appropriate indication of other parties.
A statement in a pleading may be adopted by reference in a different part of the same
pleading or in another pleading in the same court. A copy of any written instrument
which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes.
La. Code Civ. P. art. 854 provides:
No technical forms of pleading are required.
All allegations of fact of the petition, exceptions, or answer shall be simple, concise, and
direct, and shall be set forth in numbered paragraphs. As far as practicable, the contents
of each paragraph shall be limited to a single set of circumstances.
La. Code Civ. P. art. 863 provides, in part:
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to show cause provided for in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3952 must
allege proper service or waiver of service of the initial petition for divorce, that 180
days have elapsed since the service or the execution of a waiver of service of the
initial petition for divorce, and that the spouses have lived separate and apart
continuously since the filing of the original petition." 3 It must be verified by the
affidavit of the mover." 4 Verification by mover's attorney is not sufficient. t5
This motion is the sole means by which an Article 102 divorce may be
obtained. 1 6 Ordinary proceedings, involving delays for answering, a judgment
by default, and confirmation of a default judgment, may not be employed to obtain
the divorce.2"7 Neither a motion for summary judgment nor a judgment on the
pleadings may be employed for this purpose.
18
A. Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one
attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who
is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address.
B. Pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit or certificate, except as
otherwise provided by law, but the signature of an attorney or party shall constitute a
certification by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact; that it
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law; and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
C. If a pleading is not signed, it shall be stricken unless promptly signed after the
omission is called to the attention of the pleader.
Paragraphs D, E, and F of Article 863 provide for sanctions imposed upon a party or his attorney.
or both, for a violation of the provisions of the article.
Articles 855-861 provide rules for pleading special matters, most of which are inapplicable to the
Article 3952 motion for divorce.
213. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3952.
214. Id. This verification requirement is similar to those imposed with respect to a temporary
restraining order in an action for injunctive relief, La. Code Civ. P. art. 3603, and an action for
conservatory relief, La. Code Civ. P. art. 3501, except that, as noted, the verification must be by the
petitioner, not his attorney or agent, as is permitted in these two types of actions.
215. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3952.
216. La. Civ. Code art. 102; La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3952-3953, 3956, 3957(C). See La. Civ.
Code art. 102 cmt. (g). See Morrow v. Morrow. 595 So. 2d 367 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992).
217. Requiring summary proceedings was deliberate. Summary proceedings are those conducted
with rapidity, within the delays allowed by the court, and without citation and the observance of all
of the formalities required in ordinary proceedings. La. Code Civ. P. an. 2591. Divorce proceedings
should be handled expeditiously in the courts. Although exceptions and answers are permitted in
summary proceedings, La. Code Civ. P. art. 2593, experience shows that they are less likely to be
filed in summary proceedings than in ordinary proceedings. They are disposed of on the trial of the
rule or motion. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2593. Additionally, summary and ordinary proceedings are
generally scheduled on separate trial dockets, and the delays incident to the latter are usually far
greater than in summary trial dockets. Many trial courts require formal pre-trial orders and
conferences in ordinary proceedings prior to the case being assigned a trial date. The opportunities
for a defendant to delay the rendition of judgment are generally greater in ordinary proceedings than
in summary proceedings for these and other reasons. See Clay v. Clay, 389 So. 2d 31, 35 (La. 1979).
218. La. Code Civ. P. art. 969. The prohibition against the use of judgments on the pleadings
and summary judgments in divorce and related actions was to prevent collusive judgments. Amona
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The requirements of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3952 are special
pleading requirements in addition to those specified elsewhere in the Code of Civil
Procedure for pleadings generally or pleadings used in summary proceedings.
H. Service of Motion (Rule to Show Cause) and Notice of Rule to Show Cause
Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3492:
A. A notice of a rule to show cause under Civil Code Article 102
must be signed by the clerk of the court or his deputy issuing it with an
expression of his official capacity and under the seal of his office; must be
accompanied by a certified copy of the motion, order and rule to show
cause; and must contain the following:
(1) The date of issuance;
(2) The title of the cause;
(3) The name of the person to whom it is addressed;
(4) The title and location of the court issuing it;
(5) The return date, time, and place; and
(6) Statements to the following effect:
(a) The person served is being directed to appear
and show cause why a divorce should not be granted to
his spouse;
(b) The necessity for the lapse of one hundred and
eighty days from service of the petition of divorce upon
the person; and
(c) The person served is entitled to appear and
oppose the divorce action and to file motions for
incidental relief in the divorce proceeding, including
motions for spousal support, child custody, and child
support.
B. The statements required to appear in the notice shall provide
substantially as follows:
ATTENTION
YOU ARE BEING SUED FOR FINAL DIVORCE. A JUDGMENT
OF DIVORCE MAY BE RENDERED AGAINST YOU ON THE DATE
SPECIFIED IN THE ATTACHED RULE TO SHOW CAUSE UNLESS
YOU APPEAR AND OPPOSE THE RULE.
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY DAYS MUST HAVE PASSED SINCE
YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE RECEIVED THE FIRST NOTICE OF THE
DIVORCE ACTION.
v. Algiers Homestead Ass'n, 431 So. 2d 18 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983); Loeb v. Loeb, 252 So. 2d 516
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1971): La. Code Civ. P. art. 969 cmt. (a). As noted in the text infra, at notes 236-
239, these procedural devices may be utilized in a divorce action pursuant to La. Civ. Code art.
103(1) when all the conditions specified in La. Code Civ. P. art. 969(B) are complied with.
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YOU MAY SEEK CUSTODY OF CHILDREN, AND MONEY FOR
THEIR SUPPORT AND YOUR SUPPORT, AS WELL AS OTHER
RELIEF TO PROTECT YOU.
IF YOU ARE UNSURE WHAT TO DO, YOU SHOULD IMMEDI-
ATELY TALK WITH AN ATTORNEY ABOUT IT.
Unless service is waived by written waiver filed in the record," 9 the defen-
dant in the rule must be served with a certified copy of the motion, order, and rule
to show cause, and a notice of the rule to show cause issued and signed by the clerk
of court or his deputy, with an expression of his official capacity under the seal of
his office, containing the statements required by Louisiana Revised Statutes
13:3492.220 This notice requirement is parallel to that of Louisiana Revised
Statutes 13:3491 and is designed to advise the defendant in the motion unequivocal-
ly of the necessity of protecting his interests and advising him of the consequences
of inaction.
L Evidence in Article 102 Divorce Proceedings
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3956:
The facts entitling a moving party to a divorce under Civil Code
Article 102 may be established by:
(1) The petition for divorce;
(2) The sheriffs return of service of the petition, or by a
waiver of that service;
(3) The rule to show cause and the affidavit required by
Code of Civil Procedure Article 3952;
(4) The sheriff's return of service of the rule, or by a waiver
of that service; and
(5) The affidavit of the mover, executed after the filing of
the rule, that the parties have lived separate and apart continu-
ously since the filing of the original petition and that the mover
desires to be divorced.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:302:
A. In addition to any hearing otherwise authorized by law to be held
in chambers, the court by local rule, and only in those instances where
good cause is shown, may provide that only with mutual consent, civil
hearings before the trial court in divorce proceedings may be held in
chambers. Such hearings shall include contested and uncontested
proceedings and rules for spousal support, child support, visitation,
219. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3956(4), 3957(C).
220. La. R.S. 13:3492 (1991). Additionally, the notice of a rule to show cause must comply
with the requirements of La. Code Civ. P. art. 2594.
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injunctions, or other matters provisional and incidental to divorce
proceedings.
B. A motion for hearing in chambers pursuant to this Section may be
made by either party or upon the court's own motion.
C. Except for being closed to the public, the hearings held in
chambers pursuant to this Section shall be conducted in the same manner
as if taking place in open court. The minute clerk and court reporter shall
be present if necessary to perform the duties provided by law.
D. The provisions of this Section shall not be construed to repeal or
restrict the authority otherwise provided by law for any hearing to be held
in chambers.
The act provides three alternative methods of proceeding upon the return date
of the rule to show cause for a divorce. The first method of proceeding is to have
an evidentiary hearing in open court. In such a hearing, evidence of compliance
with the procedural requirements must be adduced: that a certified copy of the
initial verified petition for divorce was properly served on the defendant in the suit,
unless properly waived,22" ' that 180 days or more elapsed between that service or
waiver and the filing of the rule to show why a divorce should not be rendered, and
that proper service was made of the rule to show cause and annexed affidavit of the
mover and notice, or service was properly waived. 22 Additionally. the substan-
tive facts must be established. The mover must testify concerning the marriage of
the parties, the facts establishing jurisdiction and venue, the separation of the
parties, that the parties have lived separate and apart continuously since the filing
of the initial petition for divorce, and that-the mover desires to be divorced."3
A second method of proceeding upon the return date is to establish these facts
by filing into evidence at a hearing in open court the verified initial petition for
divorce, the sheriffs return showing proper service of the petition, or its proper
waiver, the rule to show cause and annexed affidavit of the mover,.the sheriffs
return showing proper service of the rule to show cause, or its proper waiver, and
the additional affidavit of the mover, executed after the filing of the rule, that the
parties have lived separate and apart continuously since the filing of the original
petition and that the mover desires to be divorced.224
For this second procedure, three affidavits are required. One is the affidavit
of the original petitioner for divorce verifying the allegations of that initialpetition.225 The second is the affidavit of the mover in the rule to show cause for
221. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3956(1), (2).
222. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3952, 3956 (1)-(4); La. Civ. Code art. 102.
223. La. Civ. Code art. 102; La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3952, 3956(5). Implicit in the provisions of
Article 3956 is the requirement that the facts required by La. Civ. Code art. 102 and La. Code Civ.
P. arts. 3951-3953 and 3956 be proved, either by the convenient method provided in Article 3956
or by testimonial and documentary proof. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 3956 cmi.
224. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3956.
225. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3951.
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divorce verifying the allegations of the rule to show cause. 25 The third is the
affidavit of the mover in the rule to show cause that the parties have lived separate
and apart continuously since the filing of the original petition and that the mover
desires to be divorced.227 This third affidavit is required to invoke the provisions
of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3956 permitting proof by affidavit.
It must be executed by the mover after the filing of the rule to show cause required
by Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3952.2. All of these affidavits must
be personally executed by the spouse filing the original petition or the motion for
divorce, respectively; the affidavit of the spouse's attorney is insufficient. 29
These requirements are deliberate. The three sequential affidavits ensure that
a spouse proceeds deliberately with each step in the divorcing process. They give
a spouse an opportunity to pause and reflect and make a conscious decision for each
step. The spouse who files the motion for divorce may not be the spouse who filed
the initial petition for divorce.2 It is therefore important that the motion for
divorce also be verified, and that the spouse who is actually obtaining the divorce
attests to non-reconciliation and the desire to be divorced. The spouse who files the
motion for divorce is not required to have desired a divorce when the initial petition
was filed nor is the party who filed the initial petition required to have continued
in his desire to be divorced.
The committee considered but ultimately rejected a proposal that would have
required a spouse to desire to be divorced for at least 180 days. Under that
proposal, only the spouse who filed the initial petition for divorce pursuant to
Louisiana Civil Code article 102 could file the motion for divorce required by
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3952. If the other spouse desired
assurance that the divorce would ultimately be rendered at the end of the 180-day
waiting period, he or she was required to file his or her own initial petition for a
divorce. That spouse could file a motion for divorce at the end of the 180-day
waiting period after service or waiver of service of his or her own initial petition for
divorce. This requirement would ensure that at least one of the spouses would have
the requisite desire for a divorce for a minimum of six months. The requirement
was abandoned as too burdensome and as permitting too much of an opportunity
for abuse.
A spouse could file a petition for divorce, obtain favorable incidental relief,
and forestall filing the motion for divorce for two years, continuing the incidental
relief during that period. For protection, the other spouse would be required to file
his or her own petition for divorce even if he or she did not desire a divorce at the
time of filing. In other words, one spouse may desire a divorce and file an initial
petition. The other spouse may not then desire a divorce. Both spouses may
226. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3952.
227. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3956(5).
228. Id.
229. See supra notes 136, 214-215.
230. La. Civ. Code art. 102 permits either spouse to file the rule to show cause why a divorce
should not be granted after the requisite waiting period.
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change their views by the time the 180-day waiting period has elapsed. The final
decision was that either spouse could use the filing and service, or waiver of
service, of the initial petition for the purpose of filing the motion for divorce. This
change negates the requirement that a spouse desire a divorce for six months. The
requirement of the two affidavits in connection with the motion for divorce ensures
that the party obtaining the divorce is indeed the one who currently desires it.
Another practical reason for the sequential personal affidavit requirements was
to guard against the inadvertent granting of a divorce to a spouse who no longer
wants to be divorced, or the use of the proof-by-affidavit procedure to grant a
divorce to a spouse who has reconciled. Pleadings need not be verified or
accompanied by affidavit or certificate, except as otherwise provided by law.2 '
Therefore, without an express verification requirement, an attorney could file a
motion for divorce on behalf of a person who in fact does not desire to be divorced.
This could also occur if an attorney secures the execution of all three affidavits at
the time of the filing of the initial petition. He might "mark up" the file for the
motion for divorce and either assume his client still wants to be divorced, or
through miscommunication, mistakenly believe that he is authorized to file the
motion for divorce. 23 '2 Thus, the third affidavit must be executed after the filing
of the rule to show cause.
The third method of proceeding upon the return date is to conduct either
procedure, the evidentiary hearing or the use of an affidavit, in chambers when
permitted by local rule and where good cause is shown. 3 This method is
permitted for contested or uncontested divorce proceedings and rules for incidental
relief.2 3 4 Except for being closed to the public, these hearings in chambers must
be conducted in the same manner as they would be in open court.233
Allowing three alternate methods of proceeding upon the return date of the rule
to show cause for a divorce was a deliberate decision of the committee. Using the
provisions of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3956 in uncontested cases
conserves judicial resources and time-a legitimate goal of courts and attorneys.
A court appearance by the divorcing spouse may be a traumatic experience. This
procedure eliminates the necessity of the court appearance. The divorce becomes
a matter of "paperwork." This should not be the sole method of proceeding,
however. For some spouses, a public hearing and a formal judicial pronouncement
of the termination of the* marriage is therapeutic. Ceremony, or ritual, marks the
231. La. Code Civ. P. art. 863(B).
232. Under Louisiana law, the relationship between attorney and client is one of principal and
agent. Sondes v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 501 So. 2d 829 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986); St. Paul Ins. of
Bellaire v. AFIA Worldwide Ins., 937 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1991). Although the authority of an
attorney to represent a litigant whom he claims a right to represent is presumed, this presumption of
authority is subject to rebuttal. Wadsworth v. Alexius, 234 La. 187, 99 So. 2d 77 (1958); Price v.
Taylor, 139 So. 2d 230 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
233. La. R.S. 9:302(A) (1993). This method requires the mutual consent of the parties.
234. Id.
235. La. R.S. 9:302(C) (1993).
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* beginning and ending of most of our human relationships. Baptism accompanies
birth, and the wedding ceremony accompanies marriage. Bar mitzvah and bat
mitzvah mark new life stages and changes in the parent/child relationship. Funeral
and interment help the grieved ones to accept the finality of the end of a family
relationship. Divorce symbolizes the death of the marriage and the ending of a
spousal relationship. For some spouses, a ritual or ceremony marking the end of
his or her marital relationship by divorce is as important as the wedding ceremony
marking the beginning of the marital relationship. Therefore, for the spouse who
needs the ritual of a court hearing to accept the finality it represents, such an
opportunity should be and is presented.
Usually, that hearing is public. However, where good cause is shown, local
court rules may provide for a closed hearing in chambers. This procedure
accommodates the spouses' mutual agreement that the hearing be closed to the
public, although the ceremonial character of the hearing is preserved. 36
J. Evidence and Procedure in Article 103(1) Divorce Proceedings
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 969:
A. Judgments on the pleadings and summary judgments shall not be
granted in any action for divorce or annulment of marriage, nor in any
case where the community, paraphernal, or dotal rights may be involved
in an action between husband and wife.
B. (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph A, judgments on
the pleadings and summary judgments may be granted without hearing in
any action for divorce under Civil Code Article 103(l) under the
following conditions:
(a) All parties are represented by counsel;
(b) Counsel for each party, after answer is filed, file a written
joint stipulation of facts, request for judgment, and sworn
verification by each party; and
(c) Counsel for each party file a proposed judgment containing
a certification that counsel and each party agree to the terms
thereof.
(2) The court may render and sign such judgments in chambers
without a hearing and without the taking of testimony.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1701(B):
When a defendant in an action for divorce under Civil Code Article
103(l), by sworn affidavit, acknowledges receipt of a certified copy of the
petition and waives formal citation, service of process, all legal delays,




entered against the defendant the day on which the affidavit is filed. The
affidavit of the defendant may be prepared or notarized by any notary
public. The judgment may be obtained by oral motion in open court or by
written motion mailed to the court, either of which shall be entered in the
minutes of the court, but the judgment shall consist merely of an entry in
the minutes.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1702(E):
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law to the contrary, when the
demand is for divorce under Civil Code Article 103(1), whether or not the
demand contains a claim for relief incidental or ancillary thereto, a hearing
in open court shall not be required unless the judge, in his discretion,
directs that a hearing be held. The plaintiff shall submit to the court an
affidavit specifically attesting to and testifying as to the truth of all of the
factual allegations contained in the petition, and shall submit the original
and not less than one copy of the proposed final judgment. If no answer
or other pleading has been filed by the defendant, the judge shall, after
two days, exclusive of holidays, of entry of a preliminary default, render
and sign the judgment or direct that a hearing be held. The minutes shall
reflect rendition and signing of the judgment.
Louisiana substantive and procedural law has always reflected the public
policy that the termination of a marriage cannot be the subject of a private
agreement between the spouses, and that the termination must be judicially
obtained. 37 Stringent substantive and procedural limitations discouraging
collusion between the parties enforced this public policy.238 With the adoption
237. La. Civ. Code an. 140 (1870) provided: "Separation is to be claimed, stied for and
pronounced in the competent courts of justice; it can not be made the subject of arbitration."
The marriage status of the panics is a matter of public interest, and the parties can neither dissolve
the marriage by consent nor make it indissoluble by consent. Barringer v. Dauernheim, 127 La. 679,
53 So. 923 (1911). See also Halls v. Cartwright, 18 La. Ann. 414 (1866).
238. The admission by a defendant spouse of facts alleged by the plaintiff spouse is insufficient
to authorize the granting of a divorce. Arbour v. Murray, 222 La. 684, 63 So. 2d 425 (1953).
Corroboration by a co-respondent was insufficient to establish adultery. Hayes v. Hayes, 225 La.
374, 73 So. 2d 179 (1954): Olivier v. Abunza, 226 La. 456, 76 So. 2d 528 (1954). In adultery cases
the circumstances and facts established had to be such as to lead thoroughly and necessarily to the
conclusion that adultery had been committed as alleged in the petition, Pilgrim v. Pilgrim, 235 La.
112, 102 So. 2d 864 (1958), and the proof of adultery had to be precise as to time, place, and the
person involved, Arbour, 222 La. 684, 63 So. 2d 425. If a spouse knew the name of the co-
respondent, he was required to allege the name. Shipp v. Shipp, 183 La. 1025, 165 So. 189 (1935).
Additionally, the courts developed a rule that the uncorroborated testimony of private investigators
was insufficient to support a divorce judgment based upon adultery. See Larocca v. Larocca. 597
So. 2d 1000, 1002 n.5 (La. 1992) for a discussion of the jurisprudential relaxing of this rule of
evidence.
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of true no-fault divorce, many of the procedural strictures have properly been
abandoned and new procedures instituted to facilitate the obtaining of a divorce.
An exception has been provided to the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
article 969 prohibition239 against judgments on the pleadings and summary
239. La. Code Civ. P. art. 969(A) provides: "Judgments on the pleadings and summary
judgments shall not be granted in any action for divorce or annulment of marriage, nor in any case
where the community, paraphernal, or dotal rights may be involved in an action between husband
and wife."
This provision contains a hiatus. Prior to the enactment of the Matrimonial Regimes Act, 1979
La. Acts No. 709 (effective Jan. 1, 1980), the property of married persons was divided into separate
and common property. La. Civ. Code art. 2334 (1870). The separate property of the wife was
divided into dotal and extra-dotal property. La. Civ. Code art. 2335 (1870). Dotal property, or
dowry, was that which the wife brought to the husband to support the expenses of the marriage. La.
Civ. Code arts. 2335, 2337 (1870). Extra-dotal property, otherwise called paraphernal property, was
that portion of the wife's separate property that did not form a part of her dowry. La. Civ. Code arts.
2335, 2383 (1870). Dotal property and paraphernal property were exclusive sub-classifications of
the wife's separate property. There was no provision for the dowry of the husband. All of his
separate property was simply that-his separate property. Not having a dowry, or dotal property, he
owned no extra-dotal, or paraphemal property. See Kenneth Rigby, Some Views. Old and New. on
Recent Developments in Family Law, 29 La. B.J. 232 (1982).
The prohibition in La. Code Civ. P. art. 969(A) against the use of judgments on the pleadings and
summary judgments in actions between spouses involving property rights is restricted to those in
which community, paraphernal, or dotal rights of the spouses are involved. Prior to January 1, 1980.
these procedural proscriptions did not apply when the husband's separate property rights were
involved, as they could be neither paraphernal nor dotal rights. La. Code Civ. P. art. 969 cmt. (a)
(1984) confirms that the rule was to prevent collusive judgments in divorce actions "and other suits
involving the rights of married women." It was a rule designed to protect a married woman in her
community and separate (dotal and paraphernal) property rights against her husband, who occupied
a vastly superior position as head and master of the partnership or community of gains. La. Civ.
Code art. 2404 (1870). The husband alone had the administration of his wife's dowry; she could not
deprive him of it. La. Civ. Code art. 2350 (1870). Unless she withheld from her husband the
administration of her paraphernal property, it also was under the management of her husband. La.
Civ. Code art. 2385 (1870). The husband also enjoyed the administration of community effects,
could dispose of the revenues they produced, and could alienate them by onerous title, without the
consent and permission of his wife, with limited exceptions. La. Civ. Code art. 2404 (1870). The
husband did not need any procedural protection from his wife with respect to his interest in the
community property and his separate property.
If acquired prior to January 1, 1980, the separate property of a wife is either parapheral or dotal.
To this extent, the language of the article is still applicable. However, any property of a wife
acquired after that date that is not community property is neither dotal nor paraphernal property but
simply her separate property. The same is true of property acquired by the husband either prior to
or after January 1, 1980. Property of married persons is either community or separate. La. Civ.
Code art. 2335. Therefore, with respect to property of married persons acquired on or after January
1, 1980, these procedural restrictions apply only when community property rights are involved in an
action between them.
Unfortunately, some courts have not understood these pre-1980 classifications of marital property.
In Amona v. Algiers Homestead Ass'n, 431 So. 2d 18 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983), the court, invoking
La. Code Civ. P. art. 969, reversed a trial court summary. judgment recognizing a husband "as the
owner in his separate and paraphernal estate" of certain immovable property. Not only is Article 969
inapplicable to the husband's separate property rights, he owns no "separate and paraphernal estate."
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judgments in actions for divorce or annulment of marriage or in any case where the
community, paraphernal, or dotal rights may be involved in an action between
husband and wife. These procedural devices, permitting the rendition ofjudgment
without a full trial, are available in any action for divorce under Louisiana Civil
Code article 103(1) if all of the listed conditions are present. The presence of these
conditions assures that no imposition on one spouse by the other exists. Additional-
ly, the submission of sworn verification by both parties of the factual basis for the
action reflects the view that this type of evidence is as reliable as testimonial proof
in open court, a view reflected in the provisions of Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 3956 regulating evidence in Louisiana Civil Code article 102
divorce proceedings. However, the public policy considerations barring judgments
on the pleadings and summary judgments in Louisiana Civil Code article 103(2)
and (3) actions for divorce and annulment of marriage actions still exist.
Another simplified and expedited procedure for obtaining a Louisiana Civil
Code article 103(1) divorce is provided in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
articles 1701(B) and 1702(E). If the defendant, by sworn affidavit, acknowledges
receipt of a certified copy of the petition, waives formal citation, service of process,
all legal delays, notice of trial, and appearance at trial, a judgment of default 240
Kennedy v. Kennedy, 391 So. 2d 1193, 1197 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980), writ denied, 396 So. 2d 883
(1981), held that a husband's firefighter pension benefits were "his separate and paraphernal
property."
Neither could the husband nor the wife ever acquire "separate and paraphernal property." This is
a contradiction in terms. Before 1980, the wife could acquire separate property that was dotal or
could acquire separate property that was extra-dotal, or paraphernal. After 1980, she could acquire
separate property. At all times, the husband could acquire only separate property.
Therefore, Article 969 can apply only to community property acquired by the wife at any time and
separate (dotal or paraphernal) property acquired by the wife before 1980, and to community property
acquired by the husband either before or on or after January 1, 1980. By its terms, it is inapplicable
to separate property acquired by the husband at any time and separate property acquired by the wife
on or after January 1, 1980, unless the words "paraphernal, or dotal rights" are interpreted to mean
the wife's separate rights or property.
This procedural prohibition is different from that in La. R.S. 9:291 (1993). which provides that
spouses may not sue each other except for causes of action arising out of the provisions of the
Matrimonial Regimes Act, La. Civ. Code art. 2325 et seq., and for restitution of separate property.
as well as other enumerated exceptions. There is no prohibition, for example, to an action by a wife
against her husband seeking to have property decreed to be community property rather than the
husband's separate property. However, a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment may
not be used in that action as the procedural vehicle to resolve the issue. See Arnona, 431 So. 2d at
20.
There is no longer any presumption of the possibility of imposition upon the wife by the husband
regarding marital property. The article should be amended to substitute the words "where the
community or separate property rights of either spouse may be involved" for the language discussed
above.
240. The judgment of default referred to in La. Code. Civ. P. art. 1701(B) describes what is
commonly called a "preliminary default." It is the "judgment by default" referred to in La. Code Civ.
P. arts. 928(A) and 1843. See Notes to La. Code Civ. P. art. 1701. A confirmation of the default
judgment may be obtained after two days, exclusive of holidays, from entry of the judgment of
default if no answer is timely filed. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1702(A). A final judgment rendered
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(preliminary default) may be entered against him on the day the affidavit is filed.
Additionally, the plaintiff may submit to the court an affidavit specifically
testifying to the truth of all of the factual allegations in the petition, along with the
original and at least one copy of the proposed judgment.24 The article contem-
plates a separate affidavit of the plaintiff; the verification by the plaintiff of the
petition is insufficient.
Unless the court, in its discretion, directs that a hearing be held, a hearing in
open court is not required. Two days (exclusive of holidays) after the entry of the
preliminary default, if no answer or other pleading has been filed by the defendant,
the court shall render and sign the judgment or direct that a hearing be held.242
These simplified procedures do not preclude use of a testimonial hearing to
obtain a Louisiana Civil Code article 103(l) divorce. A testimonial hearing is
available for those spouses who desire the ritual or ceremony signifying the end of
their marriages. In both types of divorces, the committee attempted to simplify the
proceedings without overlooking the needs of those spouses who value the formal
court hearing.
K. Reconciliation
Louisiana Civil Code article 104:
The cause of action for divorce is extinguished by the reconciliation
of the parties.
Reconciliation of the parties extinguishes the cause of action for divorce and
is therefore a defense to the motion for divorce pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code
article 102 as well a defense to an action for divorce based upon any of the
Louisiana Civil Code article 103 grounds or causes of action.4 3 What constitutes
reconciliation is a factual question.
against a defendant against whom a valid judgment by default has not been taken is an absolute
nullity. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2002(2); Livingston Parish Police v. Patterson, 589 So. 2d 9 (La. App.
Ist Cir. 1991); Richard v. Tri-J Indus. Constr., Inc., 478 So. 2d 215, 216 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
See also Clark v. Neel, 583 So. 2d 90, 92 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991). La. Code Civ. P. art. 1701(B)
does not authorize the waiver by the defendant of a judgment of default.
Additionally it appears doubtful, in view of La. Code Civ. P. art. 1702(E), that the delay (two days,
exclusive of holidays) for confirming the default after the entry of the preliminary default, La. Code
Civ. P. art. 1702(A), may be waived by the defendant. The term "all legal delays" in La. Code Civ.
P. art. 1701(B) probably refers to the delays for answering. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1001.
A judgment rendered prematurely because two days have not elapsed between the entering of the
preliminary default and the judgment confirming the default is null. Evans v. Hamner, 209 La. 442,
24 So. 2d 814 (1946); Cottonport Bank v. Thomas, 12 So. 2d 618 (Lu. App. 1st Cir. 1943).
241. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1702(E). This procedure is available whether or not the provisions
of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1701(B) are utilized.
242. Id.
243. Millon v. Millon, 352 So. 2d 325 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); La. Civ. Code art. 104 cmts.
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The controlling test in establishing the requisite forgiveness, acceptance by the
offender, and restoration and renewal of the marital relation that legally constitutes
reconciliation is the motives and intentions of the parties.
244
L. Nullity of Divorce Judgment
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3951:
A petition for divorce under Civil Code Article 102 shall contain
allegations of jurisdiction and venue and shall be verified by the affidavit
of the petitioner.
Louisian Code of Civil Procedure article 3951:
The rule to show cause provided under Civil Code Article 102 shall
allege proper service of the initial petition for divorce, that one hundred
eighty days or more have elapsed since that service, and that the spouses
have lived separate and apart continuously since the filing of the original
petition. The rule to show cause shall be verified by the affidavit of the
mover.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3953:
A judgment rendered under Civil Code Article 102 shall be an
absolute nullity when less than one hundred eighty days have elapsed
between service of the petition, or between execution of written waiver of
service of the petition, and filing of the rule to show cause, or when the
requirements of this Title with respect to jurisdiction and venue have not
been met.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 10:
A. A court which is otherwise competent under the laws of this state
has jurisdiction of the following actions or proceedings only under the
following conditions:
(7) An action of divorce, if, at the time of filing, one or both of the
spouses are domiciled in this state.
B. For purposes of Subparagraphs (6) and (7) of Paragraph A of this
Article, if a spouse has established and maintained a residence in a parish
of this state for a period of six months, there shall be a rebuttable
presumption that he has a domicile in this state in the parish of such
residence.
244. Garrett v. Garrett. 324 So. 2d 494, 496 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975). wri denied. 326 So. 2d
372 (1976).
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Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3941:
A. An action for an annulment of marriage or for a divorce shall be
brought in a parish where either party is domiciled, or in the parish of the
last matrimonial domicile.
B. The venue provided in this Article may not be waived, and a
judgment rendered in either of these actions by a court of improper venue
is an absolute nullity.
Four vices of form render a judgment of divorce pursuant to Louisiana Civil
Code article 102 an absolute nullity. The first occurs when a party fails to observe
the 180-day waiting period between service or written waiver of service of the
initial petition for divorce and the filing of the motion for divorce. 4" The second
occurs when a Louisiana court does not possess jurisdiction over the status of the
parties."6 The third occurs when the divorce action is filed in a court of improper
venue.247 The fourth occurs when the initial petition for divorce does not contain
the required allegations of jurisdiction and venue.248
Ordinarily, the failure to observe required procedural waiting periods or delays
is not an error or irregularity that renders a judgment an absolute nullity.24 9
However, failure to comply with the 180-day waiting period renders the resulting
divorce judgment an absolute nullity. 250 An absolutely null judgment may be
attacked by any party in interest 25' and may be attacked collaterally. -5 2 The
party asserting that the judgment is an absolute nullity is not required to do so in a
direct action of nullity, as is the case with a relatively null judgment.2 5 _1 If a direct
nullity action is instituted, it may be by summary proceedings.2-4
245. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3953.
246. La. Code Civ. P. art. 10(A)(7).
247. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3941(B).
248. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3951, 3953.
249. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. McGowan, 49 La. Ann. 630, 21 So. 766 (1897): Milner
v. Milner, 244 So. 2d 716, 720 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 258 La. 351, 246 So. 2d 198 (1971).
The premature entry of a preliminary judgment of default pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 1701(A)
may, however, subject the resulting judgment to reversal on appeal. See Kelly v. Kelleher. 186 La.
51, 171 So. 569 (1936) and Cardone v. G & R Serv. Ctr., Inc., 360 So. 2d 244 (La. App. Ist Cir.
1978).
250. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3953.
251. Wilson v. King, 227 La. 546, 79 So. 2d 877 (1955); In re Webster's Tutorship, 188 La.
623, 177 So. 688 (1937); Logwood v. Logwood, 185 La. 1, 168 So. 310 (1936); Bryant v. Pierson,
583 So. 2d 97, 99 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
252. Brana v. Brana, 139 La. 305, 71 So. 519 (1916); Jacobs v. Kansas City, S. & G. Ry., 134
La. 389, 64 So. 150 (1914); American Bank & Tr. Co. v. Marbane Inv.. Inc., 337 So. 2d 1209. 1212
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Franz v. Franz, 315 So. 2d 79 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975); Charia v.
Mungoven, 550 So. 2d 939 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
253. Nethken v. Nethken, 307 So. 2d 563 (La. 1975).
254. American Bank & Tr. Co.. 337 So. 2d at 1212.
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For a Louisiana court to render a valid divorce decree, it must possess
jurisdiction over the status of the parties, 255 that is, their legal relationship of
marriage. The relationship of marriage is not a legal entity, separate and distinct
from husband and wife. Jurisdiction over that status confers authority to terminate
the status and adjudicate the incidental issues involved in terminating the
relationship, i.e., spousal and child support, custody, and the other incidental
actions. A Louisiana court has such jurisdiction if one or both spouses are
domiciled in Louisiana when the divorce action is filed.256 The spouses need not
have cohabitated in Louisiana or established a common matrimonial domicile in
Louisiana. The prior reference in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article I OA(7)
to the place of occurrence of the grounds for a divorce was deleted.2"
The requirement that one spouse be domiciled in Louisiana when the divorce
action is filed ensures the minimum contacts required by the United States
Constitution's Due Process Clause for a state's jurisdiction to terminate a marriage
by divorce.38 If a spouse has established and maintained a residence in a parish
of Louisiana for six months, a rebuttable presumption exists, for a divorce or
annulment action only, that he or she has a domicile in Louisiana in that parish of
residence. 259 Additionally, the divorce action must be filed in a court of proper
venue. A divorce action must be brought in a parish where either spouse is
domiciled or in the parish of the last matrimonial domicile. 2 '  Usually, the
domicile of a person is in the parish where that person has his principal resi-
dence. 26' This venue may not be waived, and a judgment rendered in a divorce
action by a court of improper venue is an absolute nullity.
62
255. La. Code Civ. P. art. 10.
256. La. Code Civ. P. art. 10(7).
257. La. Code Civ. P. art. 10 previously read, in part:
A court which is otherwise competent under the laws of this state has jurisdiction of the
following actions or proceedings only under the following conditions:
(7) An action of divorce, or of separation from bed and board, if one or both of the
spouses are domiciled in this state and, except as otherwise provided by law. the
grounds therefor were committed or occurred in this state, or while the matrimonial
domicile was in this state.
258. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 65 S. Ct. 1092. reh'g denied, 325 U.S. 895, 65
S. Ct. 1560 (1945). See also Williams v. North Carolina. 317 U.S. 287, 63 S. Ct. 207 (1942).
259. La. Code Civ. P. art. 10(B). This provision does not establish a six-month waiting period
to file a divorce action; it merely creates a presumption of domicile in Louisiana. A person may in
fact establish a Louisiana domicile in less than six months by his acts and intention to do so. See
La. Code Civ. P. art. 10 cmts. (Supp. 1993).
260. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3941(A). Although the term "matrimonial domicile" has received
scholarly attention, see Robert A. Pascal, Work of the Supreme Court, I I La. L. Rev. 168 (1951), it
has not received judicial interpretation in Louisiana cases. It is generally used to designate the last
place where the spouses maintained a common home.
261. La. Civ. Code art. 38. A person may have a number of residences but only one domicile.
Wilson v. Butler, 513 So. 2d 304 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
262. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3941(B).
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What is the effect in a petition for divorce and rule to show cause of failing to
meet the allegation requirements of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles
3951 and 3952? Louisiana Civil Code article 3951 requires that the initial petition
for divorce filed pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 102 contain allegations
of jurisdiction and venue.263 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3952
requires that the motion for divorce allege proper service of the initial petition for
divorce, that 180 days or more have elapsed since that service, and that the spouses
have lived separate and apart continuously since the filing of the original petition.
Does the absence of one or more of the required allegations render the divorce an
absolute nullity?
The pleading requirements of Article 3952 do not appear to be jurisdictional;
hence the absence of one of the required allegations should, not render a divorce an
absolute nullity. Their absence may result in the motion's not stating a cause of
action for the relief sought. For example, the absence in the motion of an allegation
that 180 days or more have elapsed since the service or waiver of service of the
initial petition for divorce should not invalidate the divorce obtained pursuant to
that motion. However, if the substantive requirement is not met, i.e., less than 180
days have elapsed, the resulting judgment of divorce is an absolute nullity.
The pleading requirements of Article 3951 appear to be jurisdictional.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3953 provides in part that a divorce
judgment rendered under Louisiana Civil Code article 102 "shall be an absolute
nullity when.. the requirements of this Title with respect tojurisdiction and venue
have not been met." This article is contained in Title IV, Divorce and Annulment
of Marriage. Title IV contains Article 3941, which provides the proper venue for
the divorce action, and Article 3951, which requires the initial petition for divorce
to contain allegations ofjurisdiction and venue. It appears that if the initial petition
for a Louisiana Civil Code article 102 divorce fails to allege proper jurisdiction or
venue, or the action for an Article 102 divorce is in fact instituted in a court lacking
jurisdiction, or in a court of improper venue, the divorce judgment rendered may
be an absolute nullity under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3953.
Requiring allegations ofjurisdiction and venue in the initial petition reflects sound
policy. Neither is subject to waiver. The validity or invalidity of a divorce affects
persons other than the parties to the divorce. In many cases, the testimony in
uncontested divorces is not taken or transcribed if there is an evidentiary hearing.
The pleadings and affidavit may not otherwise reveal the factual basis for
jurisdiction or venue. Not allowing jurisdiction and venue to be waived in divorce
cases represents strong public policy; requiring a judicial declaration in the initial
petition reflects that policy.
It thus appears that the court in which the Article 102 divorce action is
instituted must in fact have jurisdiction over the status of the parties and be a court
of proper venue. Additionally, the factual basis for that jurisdiction and venue must
263. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3951 cmt. provides, in part, that "[tlwo new requirements are
contained herein: first, the petition must contain allegations of jurisdiction and venue ...."
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be alleged in the initial petition for divorce to prevent the divorce from being an
absolute nullity.
M. Abandonment of Action
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3954:
A. A divorce action instituted under Civil Code Article 102 is
abandoned if the rule to show cause provided by that Article is not filed
within two years of the service of the original petition or execution of
written waiver of service of the original petition.
B. This provision shall be operative without formal order, but on ex
parte motion of any party or other interested person, the trial court shall
enter a formal order of dismissal as of the date of abandonment.
When the required 180-day delay after service of the original petition or waiver
of service expires, either spouse may file a motion for a divorce. The committee
concluded that there should be a reasonable maximum period of time after the
mandatory waiting period in which to file the motion for divorce; it should not be
prolonged indefinitely. Louisiana Civil Code article 159 provides that a judgment
of divorce terminates a community property regime retroactively to the date of
filing of the petition in the action in which the judgment of divorce is rendered.
When there is a long delay in the rendition of a divorce judgment, a partition of
community property and settlement of claims between the spouses arising from the
matrimonial regime is more difficult and complicated and is more likely to lead to
unfair results. Reimbursement claims are increased. Accurate reconstruction of
community assets and liabilities may become more difficult or impossible. In the
partition proceedings, assets are valued as of the time of the trial on the merits of
the partition action. 26 Assets in the possession of one spouse may have increased
in value during the interim, while assets in the possession of the other spouse may
have decreased in value or become worthless, through either market forces or the
actions of the spouses. Additionally, spouses and children need to have the marital
status of the spouses resolved within a reasonable period of time.
The failure of either spouse to file the motion within the permitted time is
considered an abandonment of the divorce action and results in its dismissal. This
provision is self-operative. As originally enacted, 265 the article provided a one-
year time limit, requiring that the motion for divorce be filed within approximately
six months after the 180-day waiting period had expired. Some attorneys felt that
the original time limit for the filing of the motion was too short. In 1991, the time
limit was extended by one year to provide a limit of two years from the service of
264. La. R.S. 9:2801(2) (1993).
265. 1990 La. Acts No. 1009 (effective Jan. 1, 1991).
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the original petition or execution of written waiver of service of the original petition
for the filing of the motion for divorce.
26
This abandonment provision is applicable only to actions for a divorce
pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 102. It is inapplicable to any of the actions
for divorce instituted pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 103. Those actions
are subject to the considerably longer five-year abandonment rule of Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure article 561.267 That article provides that an action is
abandoned when the parties fail to take any step in its prosecution or defense in the
trial court for five years. The phrase "steps in its prosecution or defense" means a
formal move or action before the court intended to hasten the suit to judgment.2'
Two exceptions to the five-year rule of abandonment have been recognized: when
failure to prosecute was caused by circumstances beyond plaintiffs control, and
when defendant has waived his right to plead abandonment by taking any action in
the case inconsistent with an intent to treat the case as abandoned.269 Thus, an
action may continue for many years, as long as a formal step or action is taken at
least once every five years. Unlike Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 561,
the abandonment period in a Louisiana Civil Code article 102 divorce action
commences with service or waiver of service of the initial divorce petition. Any
step taken in the divorce proceeding other than the filing of the motion for divorce
does not extend the two-year abandonment period.
Although divorce actions pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 103 are not
subject to the two-year abandonment provisions of Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 3954, but to the five-year abandonment provisions of Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure article 561, the same considerations favoring a reasonably
prompt resolution of the marital status of the parties apply to Article 103 divorces.
266. 1991 La. Acts No. 367.
267. La. Code Civ. P. art. 561 provides:
A. An action is abandoned when the parties fail to take any step in its prosecution or
defense in the trial court for a period of five years, unless it is a succession proceeding:
(1) Which has been opened;
(2) In which an administrator or executor has been appointed; or
(3) In which a testament has been probated.
This provision shall be operative without formal order, but, on ex parte motion of any party or
other interested person, the trial court shall enter a formal order of dismissal as of the date of its
abandonment. However, the trial court may direct that a contradictory hearing be held prior to
dismissal.
B. An appeal is abandoned when the parties fail to take any step in its prosecution or
disposition for the period provided in the rules of the appellate court.
268. Evergreen Plantation, Inc. v. Zunamon, 272 So. 2d 414,416 (La. App. 2d Cir.). writ denied.
274 So. 2d 708 (1973), and the cases cited therein.
269. Succession of Knox, 579 So. 2d 1164, 1166 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991); La. Code Civ. P. art.
561 cint. (c) (1960) and the authorities cited therein.
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N. Lis Pendens and Res Judicata
1. Lis Pendens
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 531:
When two or more suits are pending in a Louisiana court or courts on
the same transaction or occurrence, between the same parties in the same
capacities, the defendant may have all but the first suit dismissed by
excepting thereto as provided in Article 925. When the defendant does
not so except, the plaintiff may continue the prosecution of any of the
suits, but the first final judgment rendered shall be conclusive of all.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3955:
The defendant spouse in an action filed under Civil Code Article 102
may file a petition for divorce in the same or another court of competent
jurisdiction and venue.
The declinatory exception of lis pendens is not applicable to an action
for divorce brought under Civil Code Article 102. The declinatory
exception of lis pendens is applicable to matters incidental to divorce.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 925:
The objections which may be raised through the declinatory exception
include, but are not limited to, the following:
(3) Lis pendens;
2. Res Judicata
Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:423 1:
Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is
conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct
review, to the following extent:
(1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of
action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
litigation are extinguished and merged in the judgment.
(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes
of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent
action on those causes of action.
[Vol. 54
LOUISIANA'S NEW DIVORCE LEGISLATION
(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the
defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent action between them,
with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its
determination was essential to that judgment.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4232:
A. A judgment does not bar another action by the plaintiff:
(1) When exceptional circumstances justify relief from the
res judicata effect of the judgment;
(2) When the judgment dismissed the first action without
prejudice; or,
(3) When the judgment reserved the right of the plaintiff to
bring another action.
B. In an action for divorce under Civil Code Article 102 or 103, in
an action for determination of incidental matters under Civil Code Article
105, in an action for contributions to a spouse's education or training
under Civil Code Article 121, and in an action for partition of community
property and settlement of claims between spouses under R. S. 9:2801, the
judgment has the effect of resjudicata only as to causes of action actually
adjudicated.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 927:
The objections which may be raised through the peremptory
exception include, but are not limited to, the following:
(2) Res judicata;
Because the exceptions of lis pendens and resjudicata are analagous, and a fair
test of lis pendens is to inquire whether a final judgment in a former suit will be res
judicata in a later suit,2 70 these two exceptions are discussed together.
The declinatory action of lis pendens is not applicable to an action for divorce
brought under Louisiana Civil Code article 102. The defendant in an Article 102
divorce action may file his or her own petition for an Article 102 divorce in the
same court or in another court of competent jurisdiction and venue. This exception
to the rule of lis pendens was adopted to prevent the plaintiff spouse from filing an
Article 102 action, securing the dismissal of an Article 102 action filed by the
defendant spouse on principles of lis pendens, and then dismissing his own suit
before the expiration of the 180-day delay so that the defendant spouse could not
270. State ex rel. Marston v. Marston, 223 La. 1046, 1054, 67 So. 2d 587, 589 (1953). Scott v.
Ware, 160 So. 2d 237, 239 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964); Miguez v. Miguez, 128 So. 2d 804, 805 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1961).
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file a motion for a judgment of divorce based upon the plaintiffs petition for
divorce.
271
Because of the amendments to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles 531
and 532 by Acts 1990, No. 521, however, if Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
article 3955 is restricted in its application as stated in the Comment (1990) the
exception of lis pendens may still be applicable in the following situations:
1. Plaintiff files a suit for a divorce pursuant to Civil Code Art. 102
and thereafter the defendant files a suit for a divorce pursuant to Civil
Code Art. 103(1), (2), or (3).
2. Plaintiff files a suit for divorce pursuant to Civil Code Art. 103(1),
(2), or (3) and thereafter the defendant files a suit for a divorce pursuant
to Civil Code Art. 102.
3. Plaintiff files a suit for a divorce based upon one of the Civil Code
Art. 103 grounds and the defendant thereafter files a suit for a divorce
based upon the same or another Civil Code Art. 103 ground.
Prior to their amendment,272 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles 531
and 532 required an identity of "cause of action" in two suits in order for lis
pendens to be applicable to the second suit.273 For example, a husband's suit for
271. La Code Civ. P. art. 3955 cmt. The plaintiff spouse can still prevent the defendant spouse
from filing a motion for a divorce based upon the initial petition of the plaintiff spouse by dismissing
it prior to the expiration of the 180-day delay. However, the defendant spouse can file his or her
own petition or a separate suit for an Article 102 divorce upon being served with the other spouse's
petition for divorce and proceed on that initial petition at the expiration of the 180-day delay.
irrespective of whether the plaintiff spouse has dismissed his or her initial petition for divorce.
1993 La. Acts No. 628 addressed the problem of the dismissal by the plaintiff spouse of his
petition prior to the expiration of the 180-day waiting period and its effect on the other spouse. It
enacted La. Code Civ. P. art. 3958 providing that a judgment dismissing a petition for divorce under
Article 102 shall be rendered (1) upon joint application of the parties and upon payment of all costs.
or (2) upon contradictory motion of the plaintiff. The contradictory motion is designed to afford the
defendant an opportunity to state why the petition should not be dismissed, i.e., the effect on pending
incidental actions or judgments, the delay in obtaining a divorce if the defendant desires a divorce,
and other considerations. Unfortunately, the statute is couched in mandatory terms in both instances.
Obviously, the petition should be dismissed if both parties desire its dismissal and comply with the
cost requirements. If dismissal is mandated upon application of the plaintiff alone, the contradictory
motion serves little purpose. Although the word "shall" is mandatory and the word "may" is
permissive, La. Code Civ. P. art. 5053 and La. R.S. 1:3 (1987), the article should be interpreted to
mandate dismissal upon joint application of the parties and to grant discretion to the court to dismiss
or not dismiss the petition upon application of the plaintiff alone. Statutory words and phrases are
to be read in their context. La. Code Civ. P. art. 5053 and La. R.S. 1:3 (1987). Words in i statute
should be interpreted so as to carry out the policy and intent of the legislature. Rathborne LUmber
& Supply Co. v. Falgout, 218 La. 629, 50 So. 2d 295 (1951).
272. Amended by 1990 La. Acts No. 521, § 2 (effective Jan. I. 1991).
273. La. Code Civ. P. art. 531 (1960) provided:
When two or more suits are pending in a Louisiana court or courts on the same cause
of action, between the same parties in the same capacities, and having the same object,
the defendant may have all but the first suit dismissed by excepting thereto as provided
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a separation based on abandonment and the wife's suit for a separation based upon
cruel treatment were suits on separate causes of action, and therefore lis pendens
was inapplicable to the second suit.274
Under the amended Articles 531 and 532 regulating lis pendens, the test is
whether the suits are "on the same transaction or occurrence" instead of an identity
of "cause of action." These articles were amended to conform to the changes made
in the defense of res judicata by the amendment of Louisiana Revised Statutes
13:4231 and enactment of Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4232 by Acts 1990, No.
521, § 1, effective January 1, 1991.275 Prior to its amendment by this act,
Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4231 provided that an essential element of res
judicata was an identity of "cause of action." Therefore, for example, if a wife filed
a suit for a separation from bed and board on the grounds of cruel treatment and
lost, she was not precluded from thereafter filing a suit for a separation from bed
in Article 925. When the defendant does not so except, the plaintiff may continue the
prosecution of any of the suits, but the first final judgment rendered shall be conclusive
of all.
La. Code Civ. P. art. 532 (1960) provided:
When a suit is brought in a Louisiana court while another is pending in a court of
another state or of the United States on the same cause of action, between the same parties
in the same capacities, and having the same object, on motion of the defendant or on its
own motion, the court may stay all proceedings in the second suit until the first has been
discontinued or final judgment has been rendered.
274. Haynie v. Haynie, 452 So. 2d 426 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984). Also, a wife's suit for divorce
based on adultery and the husband's suit for a divorce based on living separate and apart for one year
are not suits on the same cause of action; therefore, the lis pendens rule of La. Code Civ. P. art. 531
is inapplicable. Lamb v. Lamb, 411 So. 2d I (La. 1982).
275. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 531 cmt. and 532 cmt.
La. R.S. 13:4231 (1991) provides:
Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is conclusive between
the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:
(1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of action existing at the
time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the litigation are extinguished and merged in the judgment.
(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of action existing at the
time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on
those causes of action.
(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in any
subsequent action between them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and
determined if its determination was essential to that judgment.
As amended by 1990 La. Acts 521, § 1 (effective Jan. I, 1991), La. R.S. 13:4232 (1991) before
amended provided:
A judgment does not bar another action by the plaintiff:
(1) When exceptional circumstances justify relief from the resjudicata effect of the
judgment;
(2) When the judgment dismissed the first action without prejudice; or
(3) When the judgment reserved the right of the plaintiff to bring another action.
For a scholarly explanation of the broad application of the principle of issue preclusion as the test
for res judicata, see La. R.S. 13:4231 cmts. and 4232 cmts. (1991).
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and board based on other grounds, such as habitual intemperance, public
defamation, or some other Civil Code article 138 cause. Section 4231 was
amended by Acts 1990, No. 521, § 1, effective January 1, 1991, so as to change the
previous test for preclusion by judgment from an identity of causes of action to the
rule that a judgment extinguishes all causes of action "arising out of the transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation," a considerably expanded
preclusion test.27 6 Because of concern about the application of this broad res
judicata test in divorce cases, Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4232 was amend-
ed,277 to add Subsection B, providing that in an action for divorce under Louisi-
ana Civil Code articles 102 and 103, in an action for determination of incidental
matters, and in the other listed actions, the judgment has the effect of res judicata
only as to causes of action actually adjudicated.27 g Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure articles 425 and 1061 were also amended 279 to except these actions
from the mandatory requirement that a party assert all causes of action arising out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation.280
276. See La. R.S. 13:4231, cmts., 4232, cmts. (1991).
277. Amended by 1991 La. Acts 367, § 3.
278. La. R.S. 13:4232(B) (Supp. 1993) now provides:
B. In an action for divorce under Civil Code Article 102 or 103, in an action for
determination of incidental matters under Civil Code Article 105, in an action for
contributions to a spouse's education or training under Civil Code Article 121, and in an
action for partition of community property and settlement of claims between spouses
under R. S. 9:2801, the judgment has the effect of res judicata only as to causes of action
actually adjudicated.
279. 1991 La. Acts No. 367, § 2 amended both articles.
280. La. Code Civ. P. art. 425, as amended, provides:
A. A party shall assert all causes of action arising out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the litigation.
B. Paragraph A of this Article shall not apply to an action for divorce under Civil
Code Article 102 or 103, an action for determination of incidental matters under Civil
Code Article 105, an action for contributions to a spouse's education or training under
Civil Code Article 121, and an action for partition of community property and settlement
of claims between spouses under R. S. 9:2801.
La. Code Civ. P. art. 1061, as amended, provides:
A. The defendant in the principal action may assert in a reconventional demand any
causes of action which he may have against the plaintiff in the principal action, even if
these two parties are domiciled in the same parish and regardless of connexity between
the principal and reconventional demands.
B. The defendant in the principal action, except in an action for divorce under Civil
Code Article 102 or 103, shall assert in a reconventional demand all causes of action that
he may have against the plaintiff that arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the principal action.
The comments to La. Code Civ. P. arts. 425 and 1061 and La. R.S. 13:4232 (Supp. 1993) state
that the amendments were enacted to clarify that a party to a divorce action is not required to raise
the actions commonly associated with divorce actions, such as claims for spousal support and child
support, in the divorce action itself. Such claims historically have been assertable after the divorce
action has been concluded by judgment. The added language makes it clear that the law has not been
changed in that respect. Failure to raise these related causes of action will not result in their being
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Articles 531 and 532 were not similarly amended. For lis pendens, the test remains
whether the actions instituted are based "on the same transaction or occurrence."
In a divorce action, whether under Louisiana Civil Code article 102 or any of
the Article 103 provisions, what is the "transaction or occurrence" that is the
subject matter of the litigation? It is the marriage of the parties, or at least the
events leading to the termination of the marital relationship. If a husband files an
action for divorce pursuant to Article 102 and the wife thereafter files an action for
divorce based on the adultery of the husband pursuant to Article 103(2), is the
second suit based "on the same transaction or occurrence" as the first? If so, the
second suit is barred by lis pendens and may be dismissed. The same issue arises
in the other instances enumerated.
In spite of the restrictive language of the comment as to its purpose, Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure article 3955 may be interpreted to make lis pendens
applicable only to Louisiana Civil Code article 103 actions for divorce. The first
sentence does not limit the defendant spouse to filing an Article 102 action; the
defendant may also file an Article 103 action for divorce (situation 1 above)."'
The second sentence may be interpreted as permitting the defendant spouse to file
an Article 102 action after the plaintiff spouse has filed either an Article 102 or an
Article 103 action (situation 2 above). 2  Only in situation 3 above is the second
suit precluded by lis pendens under this interpretation.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 531 proscribes the filing of two or
more "suits" on the same transaction or occurrence in the same or different
Louisiana courts, not the assertion of an action based upon the same transaction or
occurrence in the same "suit" in the same court. 3 Thus, it 'does not appear that
barred by a subsequent judgment in the divorce action. This rejection of the broad common law
"issue preclusion" test for res judicata in divorce actions prevents the unfortunate results illustrated
in Brown v. Brown, 377 So. 2d 438 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979), affd. 387 So. 2d 565 (1980). cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 966, 101 S. Ct. 1482 (1981).
281. The first sentence of La. Code Civ. P. art. 3955 provides that the defendant in a La. Civ.
Code art. 102 action "may file a petition for divorce in the same or another court of competent
jurisdiction and venue." The quoted language includes a petition for divorce pursuant to La. Civ.
Code art. 103.
282. The declinatory exception of lis pendens is always applicable to the second suit filed since
this will be the suit dismissed if lis pendens is applicable. La. Code Civ. P. art. 53 1.
283. The word action has a well-defined meaning and is carefully used in the Code of Civil
Procedure. It is defined in La. Code Civ. P. art. 421 as follows: "A civil action is a demand for the
enforcement of a legal right. It is commenced by the filing of a pleading presenting the demand to
a court of competent jurisdiction ... "
In the Code of Civil Procedure, "action" means "instituted action," La. Code Civ. P. art. 421 cmt.
(a), or a cause of action that has been "instituted" by being asserted in a pleading seeking judicial
relief, id. This use of the word and this definition of "action" is used throughout Title 11. "Actions."
La. Code Civ. P. arts. 421-611. For example, Article 422 defines a personal action, a real action, and
a mixed action. The second paragraph of Article 423 pertains to a premature action. Article 425
requires that a party assert all causes of action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the litigation. Articles 426-428 regulate the effect of death of a party upon an
action. Articles 461-465 regulate cumulation of actions. Article 461 provides that "Iclumulation of
actions is the joinder of separate actions in the same judicial demand, whether by a single plaintiff
19931
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Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 531 precludes the institution of any of the
divorce actions as a reconventional demand or a separate petition filed in the same
suit, but applies only to actions instituted in a separate suit filed in the same court
or in another Louisiana court.
The declinatory exception of lis pendens is applicable to all matters incidental
to divorce, such as custody, visitation, support of a minor child or spouse,
injunctive relief, use and occupancy of the family home, and use of other
property.8 4 It is also applicable to other related actions not incidental to a
divorce action, including partition proceedings and a claim for contributions to
education and training.
285
As previously noted, Louisiana Revised Statues 13:4232 was amended to add
Subsection B, providing that in the enumerated actions res judicata is applicable
"only as to causes of action actually adjudicated." This limitation in these actigns
precludes the defense of res judicata as to causes of action that could have been, but
were not, pleaded and causes of action pleaded but upon which no judgment was
rendered. A judgment is the solemn adjudication of a court of law made in a suit
upon the relative claims of the parties thereto, as disclosed by the record.8 6 The
words "actually adjudicated" confirm the narrow application of the res judicata
principle in these type actions.
0. Injunctive Relief and Restraining Orders
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3604:
A. A temporary restraining order shall be endorsed with the date and
hour of issuance; shall be filed in the clerk's office and entered of record;
shall state why the order was granted without notice and hearing; and shall
expire by its terms within such time after entry, not to exceed ten days, as
against a single defendant, or by one or more plaintiffs against one or more defendants."
Articles 462 and 463 permit the cumulation of two or more actions "even though based on
different grounds" if the requirements of those articles are met. Article 465 permits a court to order
a separate trial of cumulated actions, even if the cumulation is proper. Article 561 regulates the
abandonment of an action either in the trial or appellate court. Chapter 5, Articles 591-611, regulates
class and secondary actions. Chapter 6, Articles 1031-1116, regulates the incidental actions of
reconvention, cross-claims, intervention, and the demand against third parties.
For further discussions of the distinctions between suits and actions, see Jahncke Service, Inc. v.
Coleman, 356 So. 2d 468 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977); Harris v. Bardwell, 373 So. 2d 777, 781-82 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1979); Scott v. Ware, 160 So. 2d 237 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964); Sims v. Sims, 247 So.
2d 602, 604-05 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971); Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Gagnard, 223 So. 2d 233,
237 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969); Miguez v. Miguez, 128 So. 2d 804 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961); Martin
Exploration Co. v. Joli Servs., Inc., 360 So. 2d 902 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978); Fertel, Inc. v. Jahncke
Serv., Inc., 210 So. 2d 143 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
284. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3955.
285. These actions are subject to lis pendens because they are not exempted by La. Code Civ.
P. art. 3955 from the lis pendens provisions of La. Code Civ. P. art. 531.
286. Allen v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 243 La. 840, 847, 147 So. 2d 865, 867 (1962).
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the court prescribes. A restraining order for good cause shown, and at any
time before its expiration, may be extended by the court for one or more
periods not exceeding ten days each. The party against whom the order
is directed may consent that it be extended for a longer period. The
reasons for each extension shall be entered of record.
B. Nevertheless, a temporary restraining order issued in conjunction
with a rule to show cause for a preliminary injunction prohibiting a spouse
from:
(1) Disposing of or encumbering community property;
(2) Harming the other spouse or a child; or
(3) Removing a child from the jurisdiction of the court, in
a suit for divorce shall remain in force until a hearing is held on
the rule for the preliminary injunction.
C. A temporary restraining order issued in conjunction with a rule to
show cause for a protective order filed in an action pursuant to the
Protection from Family Violence Act, R. S. 46:2121, et seq., shall remain
in force until a hearing is held on the rule for the protective order or for
thirty days, whichever occurs first; however, at any time before its
expiration, it may be extended by the court for a period not exceeding
thirty days.
Although normally a temporary restraining order may not be initially issued
for a period exceeding ten days, 287 such an order issued to prevent a spouse from
disposing of or encumbering community property, 2 8 harming the other spouse
or a child,28 9 or removing a child from the jurisdiction of the court remains in full
force and effect until a hearing is held on the rule for the preliminary writ of
injunction,29 although that period exceeds ten days. A temporary restraining
order issued in connection with a rule to show cause for a protective order filed in
an action pursuant to the Protection from Family Violence Act may not be initially
issued for a period exceeding thirty days. 29
Once the preliminary injunction is issued, it is effective against the parties
restrained from the time they receive actual knowledge of the order by personal
service or otherwise. It remains in effect from the time of actual knowledge until
it is dissolved or modified by further orders of the court. 292
287. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3604(A).
288. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3604(B)(1) implements La. R.S. 9:371 (1993), which provides: "In
a proceeding for divorce, a spouse may obtain an injunction restraining or prohibiting the disposition
or encumbrance of community property until further order of the court."
289. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3604(B)(2) implements La. R.S. 9:372 (1993), which provides: "In
a proceeding for divorce, a court may grant an injunction prohibiting a spouse from harassing or
physically or sexually abusing the other spouse or a child of either of the parties."
290. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3604(B)(3).
291. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3604(C).
292. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3605; Hoffpauir v. Hoffpauir, 254 So. 2d 671 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971),




Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:375:
A. When the court renders judgment in an action to make executory
past-due payments under a spousal or child support award, or to make
executory past-due installments under an award for contributions made by
a spouse to the other spouse's education or training, it shall, except for
good cause shown, award attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing party.
B. When the court renders judgment in an action to enforce child
visitation rights it shall, except for good cause shown, award attorney's
fees and costs to the prevailing party.
The new substantive and procedural rules with respect to attorney's fees and
costs incurred in an action for divorce have been treated earlier. Previously,
attorney's fees could be awarded in an action to make past-due alimony or child
support executory or to enforce visitation rights.293 The 1990 amendment added
an action to make executory past-due installments under an award for contributions
made by a spouse to the other spouse's education or training, a type of proceeding
similar to the other enumerated actions. Attorney's fees must be awarded, except
for good cause shown, to the party who succeeds in the action, the "prevailing
party," not just the party obtaining an executory judgment or judgment enforcing
visitation rights. A party who successfully defends such an action must also be
awarded attorney's fees, except for good cause shown. Additionally, in an action
to make executory past-due installments under an award pursuant to Louisiana Civil
Code articles 121-124 for contributions made by a spouse to the other spouse's
education or training, the court must, except for good cause shown, award
attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing party. The same consistent rule is
applied to this action as is applied to an action to make executory past-due
payments under a spousal or child support award and an action to enforce child
visitation rights.
III. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article has been twofold: to preserve a historical account
of the deliberations resulting in the enactment of the divorce legislation of 1990 and
to provide useful commentary about the new substantive and procedural articles for
the Louisiana practitioner.
Reconstructing nearly seven years of discussions and decisions in an attempt
to preserve the process and content of deliberations constituted an enormous task.
293. La. R.S. 9:305 (repealed by 199) La. Acts No. 1009, § 9), prior to its repeal and
replacement by La. R.S. 9:375 (1991), provided: "When the court renders judgment in an action to
make past due alimony or child support executory, or in an action to enforce child visitation rights,
except for good cause, the court shall award attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party."
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The sheer volume of materials and minutes was daunting. However,.now that the
task is completed, the aspiration of the authors is that certain approaches to issues
of marriage and divorce not be reinvented like the proverbial wheel. The authors
likewise felt a responsibility to provide guidance to members of the legal
community and the public in the form of commentary on the substantive and
procedural articles enacted in 1990.
Even though the Persons Committee of the Law Institute had the benefit of
other states' experience in reforming divorce law, the committee did not necessarily
avoid the perceived mistakes made by other jurisdictions. In some cases the
committee members simply rejected proposals offered to eliminate the hardships
documented after the enactment of no-fault divorce reform. In other cases the
Council of the Law Institute or the legislature rejected proposed legislative
solutions. In fact, the revision process is not yet complete since the bill reforming
the law of alimony was deferred by a committee of the House of Representatives
in 1993.
No legislation can ease completely the painful experience of divorce. Divorce
is a difficult decision made by one or both of the parties to terminate an intimate
relationship, difficult for the children to accept, and difficult for those involved to
survive unscarred. To the extent that the new divorce legislation eases the
transition to a new life for the parties and their children, the members of the
committee take solace. That was surely the intention.
1993]

